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The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting
Legal Ideologies and Persistent
Formalist Subversion
By HAYWARD D. REYNOLDS*
Introduction
Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court1 reveals the
conservative formalist2 agenda of the Burger-Rehnquist Court3 in regard
to jurisdictional issues under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Burnham, the Court upheld an assertion of transient
jurisdiction4 over a nonresident husband in a California divorce action.
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; B.A., Indiana University, 1953;
J.D., Indiana University Law School, 1965.
1. 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990). In Burnham, Justice Scalia argues that the long-standing ac-
ceptance of transient jurisdiction is sufficient basis to withstand a due process attack under
International Shoe standards. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). This is clearly a conservative-formalist approach that clings to the past and eschews a
social-functional conception of jurisdiction and due process.
2. By the term "formalism," I mean the ideology of legal rules, concepts, and doctrines
as concrete entities determined by neutral logic, standardized word meanings, specific defini-
tions, and objective criteria. Despite salient attacks on formalism by the sociological jurispru-
dence movement, legal realism movement, natural law movement, and the critical legal studies
movement, formalism remains a dominant force in legal culture. In recent years formalism
has been injected with new vigor by the conservative Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
during the Burger-Rehnquist era. For further reference see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 1-18 (1977); KELSO & KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984);
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); S. BURTON, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 169-70, 193-98 (1985).
3. I have treated the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court as a single entity because the
primary impetus behind the Nixon and Reagan appointments to the Court was the desire to
restructure the Court along conservative formalistic lines in order to recapture older notions of
federalism and to curb the development of fundamental rights.
4. 110 S.Ct. at 2119. Transient jurisdiction refers to the notion that a state may exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident who is served with process inside the state. Under this territo-
rial power doctrine, the resident need not have any connection or relationship to the state
other than the fact that he was in the state at the time he was served with process. After
International Shoe, many scholars felt that transient jurisdiction violated due process. See
Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdic-
tion, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1980); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After
World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729 (1981).
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This decision put to rest the social-functionalist argument5 that the terri-
torially inspired concept of transient jurisdiction was inconsistent with
the minimum contacts/fair-play standard of International Shoe.6 Burn-
ham, along with Kulko v. Superior Court,7 World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,8 Rush v. Savchuk,9 Heliocopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia, S.A. v. Hall,10 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,"
gives startling and disheartening evidence of a reactionary formalism
much like that of the Courts during the late 19th Century and the first
third of the 20th Century.12
In the 1930s and 1940s this formalism gave way to a social-fumc-
tional approach to constitutional interpretation, which was prompted by
severe social and economic upheaval and by the emergence of the new
legal thinking advocated by the legal realists.'" Under the sway of legal
realism, legal concepts became functional tools to meet perceived social
needs and objectives. This approach shifted concern from the develop-
ment of neat, neutral, antiseptic legal concepts to the development of
5. By the term social-functionalism, I refer to the sociological jurisprudence movement
and the legal realism movement which emphasize that law must always be in step with actual
social practices, social needs, and social values. These movements take the position that legal
concepts, rules, and doctrines are functional creations governed by social policy considerations
and not by logic. Under this view, there is a necessary and dynamic relationship between law
and social need, practices, and values. Law simply cannot be separated from its social ethos.
This stands in sharp contrast to the formalist view that law is a separate and distinct entity
with it's own logic, history and methodology.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
8. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
9. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
10. 466 U.S. 408 (1983).
11. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
12. During this era the dominant legal philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court was legal
formalism. The Court interpreted and applied the Constitution in a mechanical fashion with-
out regard for social need and social value. Constitutional provisions were given dictionary
type meanings that served to preserve the states quo and thwart social change. See G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 2; White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
13. The legal realists savagely attacked the formalist legal philosophy in which constitu-
tional law emphasized original intent and conservative values. The realists took the position
that legal rules were merely a verbal facade that inhibited change. The realists argued that to
understand law legal actors must look at the actual practices of people and institutions in
everyday life. Legal concepts were to be socially sensitive creations to facilitate change and to
achieve socially desired consequences. The first step, according to the realists, would be to cast
off the shackles of legal formalism. The next step would be to create socially functional legal
concepts responsive to social needs and values as well as the dynamic nature of human interac-
tion. Interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause had to be geared to
current social needs and values and capable of change as society changed.
legal concepts that could facilitate social change. Social fact, 4 social
needs, and social values were to be the dominant features of constitu-
tional and legal exegesis. Constitutional and legal concepts were per-
ceived as fluid, dynamic, and pragmatic. Due process, the Commerce
Clause, and federalism took new forms. The interpretation of constitu-
tional provisions depended more on perceived social needs and values
than on fixed, historical meanings mysteriously, authoritatively, and suc-
cinctly enshrined in the words of the Constitution by omniscient drafters.
With the appointment of a conservative Justice to replace liberal
Justice Brennan and a substantial likelihood that liberal Justice Marshall
will also be replaced by a conservative Bush appointee, it seems that the
Burger-Rehnquist conservative reactionary agenda in the law of jurisdic-
tion will be fully realized.
Even though the Court in the 1970s and 1980s has enunciated a
formalist approach to jurisdiction that has discouraged a fully social-
functional concept of jurisdiction, a realistic appraisal of the Burger-
Rehnquist Court's actions as opposed to its verbal formulations and ra-
tionalizations reveals certain basic notions that may be of use to legisla-
tors, practitioners, and scholars in forming strategies for legislation,
litigation, and theory. This Article will present a social-functional refor-
mulation and organization of jurisdictional theory from Pennoyer v.
Neffl5 to International Shoe Co. v. Washington16 to Burnham v. Superior
Court,17 which will pierce the veil of obfuscation and rhetoric of the Bur-
ger-Rehnquist Court's opinions and reach to the social-functional core of
the Court's actions."8
In Part I of this Article, I argue that International Shoe and Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 19 should be understood as
the creation of a revolutionary concept of jurisdiction that would sup-
plant Pennoyer territorialism with a social-functional approach. Interna-
tional Shoe and Mullane constructed a new paradigm of jurisdiction
14. The term "social fact" refers to actual social practices and problems. It involves per-
ception of social problems and their effects. It involves "looking out the window" rather than
looking in the hermetically sealed confines of the law library. It is an empirical and experien-
tial outlook.
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), rev'd 433 U.S. 180 (1977). Pennoyer established the notion that a
state's power to affect the lives and property of people is limited to things and people inside its
territorial boundaries (state lines). Id. at 730-31. This is the territorial notion of jurisdiction to
which I continually refer in this Article.
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990).
18. The term "social-functional core" refers to the social policy factors that lie at the
heart of the Court's decisions and which are not made explicit.
19. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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based on contemporary social needs and values and were an integral part
of the constitutional revolution of the 1930s and 1940s. International
Shoe was not the incremental evolution that lawyers tend to view it as;
rather, it was revolutionary. It opened the way, consistent with other
constitutional developments, to new ways of seeing, thinking about, and
granting jurisdiction.
Part II elucidates the methodology the Burger-Rehnquist Court
used to subvert the social-fmctional approach of International Shoe and
Mullane and subtly reinstate much of Pennoyer's territorialism. The
cases beginning with Shaffer v. Heitner20 and Kulko v. Superior Court2"
and ending with Burnham,22 which are presented as the inexorable work-
ing out of International Shoe standards via the minimum contacts/fair-
play doctrine actually subvert International Shoe's vision.
Part III presents and discusses the position that despite formalist
protest, the proper interpretation and application of the Due Process
Clause and International Shoe would allow a state with legitimate inter-
est or need to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to effec-
tuate that interest or need. This portion of the paper argues that under
the social-functional standards of due process and federalism established
in the 1930s and 1940s, the legal limits on state power are either funda-
mental individual interests or federal interests protected under various
federal constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause and the
foreign affairs powers.
Part IV of this Article presents the social-functional argument that
the Court since Hanson v. Denckla23 has used jurisdiction primarily as a
method of policing and forestalling state court choices of law. The Court
has chosen to characterize jurisdiction as a procedural due process con-
cept in order to prevent undesired choices of law by state courts under
substantive due process choice of law cases which grant state courts al-
most unfettered power to apply their law, given a legitimate interest or
need to do so.
20. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaffer was the first major jurisdiction case decided by the Bur-
ger Court that invalidated a state court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
In it the Court applied the International Shoe doctrine to the in rem concept and indicated that
in rem and in personam jurisdictional actions were subject to the same due process standards.
Id. at 211-12. While on the surface, the case seemed to be a social-functional decision, it was
in reality an attack on quasi in rem actions like Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), rev'd 433
U.S. 186 (1977), which the Court felt were contrary to territorial notions of jurisdiction.
21. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
22. 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990).
23. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See infra sections II and IV for discussion of the case.
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Part V presents the argument that regardless of formalist rhetoric,
jurisdiction has always been a matter of social need and social policy-
that is, a social-functional concept. Pennoyer v. Neffs dogmatic state-
ment of the territorial limits of jurisdiction was contradicted by the ex-
tra-territorial reality of the in rem concept and prior judicial decisions.24
When "realistically" analyzed, the Pennoyer-inspired fictions of quasi in
rem, transient jurisdiction, presence, and implied consent, support the
social policy character of jurisdiction, and the proposition that a state's
legitimate need or interest is the primary operative factor justifying extra-
territorial jurisdiction under due process analysis.
Part VI summarizes the basic social-functional propositions
presented and discussed in the prior sections of this paper.
In a very basic sense the controversy over the appropriate way to
understand and implement International Shoe's25 vision reduces to the
familiar dispute between formalists and social-functionalists over the na-
ture and function of law and legal concepts. In this controversy, the
formalist perspective is in the ascendancy and has progressively domi-
nated the Burger-Rehnquist Court's development of the minimum con-
tacts/fair-play doctrine. The Burger-Rehnquist Court has taken the
essentially social-functional conception of International Shoe and recast
it in formalist territorial terms by the procedural due process characteri-
zation of jurisdiction; the bifurcation of contacts and fairness; and the
artificial separation of choice of law and jurisdictional questions. The
Burger-Rehnquist Court has shown its formalist territorial preferences in
its rhetoric of rules and tests that deny a policy-making role for the Court
and by its rejection of the pragmatic, social-functional approach prof-
fered by International Shoe and due process theory. The dispute is a
classic example of the clash of jurisprudential perspectives and demon-
strates the practical significance of legal theorizing. Although jurispru-
dential theories and perspectives are normally thought of as ivory tower
matters, the choices one makes about the way to view law and society are
of critical practical importance in the everyday conduct of legal business.
Jurisprudential conceptions, avowed or unconscious, form the frame-
work for the meaning and application of legal concepts and provide the
contours of the field of choices open to judicial actors.
24. 95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1878).
25. 326 U.S. 310.
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I. International Shoe as Revolutionary Paradigm
In 1945, during an era in which there was a radical change in the
Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the concept of federalism, the
Court in International Shoe announced a revolutionary decision under
the Due Process Clause that had the same far-reaching effects for juris-
dictional theory as West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish26 had for due process
theory, and National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co. 27 had for the Commerce Clause and traditional notions of federalism.
In order to fully understand International Shoe, one must consider it
in the social, economic, and constitutional context that produced this
radical change in constitutional jurisprudence. International Shoe and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.28 were products of so-
cial changes in the 20th Century and of legal realist thinking. American
society had moved from a localized, agrarian society where state lines
constituted important social and economic boundaries, to an urban in-
dustrialized society where modes of living and conducting business tran-
scended state boundaries and made them much less significant.29 The
United States moved inexorably toward social, economic, and political
unity. The legal realist's social-functional conception of law and legal
institutions provided the Court with a theoretical framework for inter-
26. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). This case is typically regarded as the pivotal case in the change
from the formalist approach to substantive due process in the era of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), to the modern approach which allows states to regulate economic interests.
The Court, in light of s6cial needs in the new regulatory state, began a new era of due process
under a social-functional approach. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, Constitu-
tional Law, 350-60 (3d ed. 1986).
27. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In this case the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act and overruled a long line of cases which had held that Congress could not
regulate production, mining, and agricultural activities under the Commerce Clause. This case
marked a revolutionary change in federalism notions. Essentially what developed was a social-
functional concept of federalism in which the lines between state and federal power were dy-
namic and functional. Under the new federalism federal power was not limited by the exist-
ence of states and states were allowed to regulate commercial and social matters so long as
they did not interfere unduly with federal interests and policies. See generally Stem, The Com-
merce Clause and The National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946) (tracing
the history of the Commerce Clause and its relation to the national economy).
28. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
29. This change is evidenced by the expansive interpretation of the commerce clause ren-,
dered in the 1930's which ceded to Congress the power to meet and unify the social and
economic needs of the people of the United States. State powers were no longer a legal limit on
the reach of the commerce clause. The new commerce clause also prevented states from inter-
fering with interstate commerce. State lines were not to be barriers to social or economic
intercourse. The change is also evidenced by the development and adoption, by all states, of
the Uniform Commercial Code and the proliferation of many other uniform acts to meet the
social and business needs of a people striving to be sure of economic and social unity.
[Vol. 18:819
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preting and applying constitutional provisions in a way that allowed the
social change and growth that had been inhibited by rigid, conservative
formalism.3" International Shoe and Mullane were manifestations of the
new legal thinking and should be seen in this context.
The dynamics of social and economic interchange, as well as dra-
matic changes in our ideas about social policy, required drastic alteration
of anachronistic notions of territorial jurisdiction. An example of change
in social policy was the change of tort theory from a liability model fo-
cused on proof of the defendant's fault or blameworthiness to a model of
tort law as an efficient and effective way of allocating losses and compen-
sating plaintiffs injured by the risks created by our industrialized soci-
ety.3" The elimination of the doctrines of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, by law or by jury nullification, is tangible evidence of
the movement toward a plaintiff-oriented tort model. Change was partic-
ularly obvious in the area of products liability, where the doctrine of
privity of contract was abolished in the face of perceived social need and
where the liability of manufacturers moved from the traditional negli-
gence model to a type of strict liability treating the fault of the defendant
as only of secondary importance.32 The development of the notions of
implied warranties also evidences this shift in tort perspectives.33
These same changes in social policy and tort theory were reflected in
the radical changes in the area of choice of law in tort cases. Much of the
impetus for a change to a modem interest and policy analysis 34 in choice
of law occurred in the tort area. The traditional, formalist rule that re-
quired the courts to apply the law of the state where the injury occurred
came under heavy fire because of its insensitivity to social fact and social
need. One renowned conflicts scholar, Professor Ehrenzwieg, suggested
that the revolution in choice of law was prompted by, and a reflection of,
the radical change in orientation in tort law toward enterprise liability
30. See generally White, supra note 12 (describing the changing modes of American Juris-
prudence during the first three decades of the twentieth century).
31. See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws - Towards a Theory of Enter-
prise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 598-99 (1960).
James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of Negligence Actions in THE ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 35 (1970).
32. James, supra note 31, at 36-38.
33. Implied warranties are often associated with contract law. However, in regard to
personal injury claims, they are clearly tort matters with regards to damages and functional
operation. By shifting to a strict liability model under the rubric of warranty, formalists were
able to maintain their conservative conception of negligence. In this way formalist 19th cen-
tury notions of negligence as a defendant fault oriented concept were preserved.
34. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 31. Ehrenzweig argues that the change to an interest
analysis approach to choice of law from a rules approach should be seen as limited to the
revolution in tort law policy. Id. at 602-04.
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where insurance and calculability were the fundamental premises, rather
than the defendant's fault.35 Some of the important cases leading the
choice of law revolution were tort cases such as Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc. 36 and Babcock v. Jackson,37 which involved choosing the law
that would allow the plaintiff to recover.
Because of the intimate interrelationship between choice of law and
jurisdiction, it was inevitable that the plaintiff-oriented tort policy would
also manifest itself in jurisdictional theory and practice. Forum shopping
for plaintiff-oriented tort law was bound to affect jurisdictional notions as
well.3' This effect can also be seen in the development of the long-arm
statutes in which tort cases were always in the forefront.39 Two recent
U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in 1984 also illustrate the effect of tort
policy changes on jurisdictional law. In Calder v. Jones' and Keeton v.
Hustler,"1 the Burger-Rehnquist Court upheld state court extraterritorial
35. Id. at 598-99.
36. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). Kilberg is one of the most well known cases in
which a court rejected the traditional rules approach to choice of law in tort cases. In this case
the New York court rejected application of the traditional rule of the place of injury and
instead applied the law of New York which provided for full compensation in a wrongful death
action. Id. at 527-28. The application of the law of the place of injury would have limited
recovery to $15,000. Id. at 527. The court chose the law which would give adequate compen-
sation to the plaintiff.
37. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). In Babcock the New York Court of Appeals
again rejected the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases. Id. at 285. The New York court
applied New York's plaintiff-oriented tort policy which allowed the passenger in an auto to sue
the driver for negligently inflicting injury on the plaintiff's passenger. Id. at 284.
38. See Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E. 2d 439 (1965); Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels Int'l. Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851 (1967); Scanapico v. Richmond, F.
& P.R.R. Co., 439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970).
39. It was tort cases such as Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), and Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) which led
the revolution in choice of law theory. Likewise, it was tort cases, particularly product liability
and personal injury cases, such as Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) and Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57 (1959), that led the way in the development of longarm jurisdic-
tion statutes. See CURRIE, CRAMPTON, & KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAW 565 (3d Ed. 1981) in
which the authors note that the courts tend to construe "tortious act" provisions of long arm
statutes more expansively than other provisions.
40. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In this case the Court validated the California court's jurisdiction
over two Florida newspaper reporters who had defamed a California resident. Jurisdiction
was obtained under a California long-arm statute on the theory that the distribution of the
article in California constituted a tort in California. Id. at 786 n.5. The plaintiff did not have
to sue the defendants at their Florida residence, therefore, the exercise of extra-territorial juris-
diction can be characterized as plaintiff-oriented. I. at 788-90.
41. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the Court held that the regular circulation of
magazines in the forum state was sufficient to support jurisdiction. Id. at 773-81.
jurisdictional assertions that favored plaintiffs.42 These cases involved in-
terstate defamation suits, and the Court validated the plaintiff's choice of
forum. If tort policy was becoming plaintiff-oriented and social-func-
tional, it would make good social-functional sense to relax or change the
defendant orientation found in the traditional territorial notion that stra-
tegically favored defendants by requiring plaintiffs to sue the defendant
at the defendant's domicile.
Similarly, the social-functional approach to law and legal institu-
tions that questioned the rigid formalistic concepts in many areas of the
law, prompted policy changes in which social fact and s6cial need be-
came the important and critical yardsticks for creating and applying
legal concepts, doctrine, and rules.43 The Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), for example, was essentially a social-functional enterprise
under the direction of Karl Llewellyn. The aim of the U.C.C. in Article
2 was to develop flexible contractual standards that would fit the needs
and realities of commercial transactions and would also be capable of
adjusting to changing needs and business practices.' 4 The rigid, formal-
ist rules of contract were relaxed. The mirror image notion of offer and
acceptance was cracked by the provisions of Article 2, 41 and the formali-
ties of the Statute of Frauds" and the parol evidence rule were relaxed.47
Though Article 2 purportedly applied to sales-of-goods contracts only,
its reformative changes and social-functional view of contracts are also
an attack on formalist contract doctrines in general, and can be used, if
only by analogy, to alleviate and change the socially unresponsive rigid-
ity of formalist contract theory.4 In a functional sense, contract reform
has made contract law more sensitive to plaintiffs' needs by providing
ways to enforce contracts where traditional contract doctrine would not
42. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-91; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
43. For example, Gilmore's notion of the death of contract is a rejection of the formalist
concept of contract created by Holmes, Langdell, and Williston. See G. GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 12-19 (1974).
44. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1990), for a statement of purposes for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
45. See Id. §§ 2-204 to 2-208, which modify the traditional rules of contract formation.
46. See Id § 2-201, which modifies the infamous Statute of Frauds for sales of goods
transaction.
47. See Id § 2-202, which makes the parol evidence rule more amenable to actual com-
mercial practices.
48. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly in the flexible provisions for
contract formation, is a realist attack on the formalist, objective theory of contract formulated
by Holmes and Williston. See Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Code, 11 Vill.
L. Rev. 213, 253-58; G. Gilmore, supra note 43; FRIEDMAN, HisTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
692 (1985).
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recognize plaintiffs' claims or needs.49 The changes in contract policy
have also spawned changes in choice of law in contract cases. The for-
malist rules of the 1934 Restatement of Conflicts of Law50 were replaced
by a social-functional approach that sought to apply the law that would
validate the legitimate contractual expectations of the parties and reach
results consistent with current social needs and values.51 Forum shop-
ping for socially responsive contract law inevitably put pressure on the
outdated, antifunctional, territorial notions of jurisdiction.5 2 The more
plaintiff-oriented approach of contemporary contract law is manifested in
long-arm statutes that give the forum jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant who transacts any business in the forum or contracts outside
the forum to provide services or goods to people within the forum.
53
49. For example, in the U.C.C. there may be an enforceable contract if the parties have
intended to make a contract even though some of the terms have been left open. U.C.C. § 2-
204(3). Similarly a firm offer by a merchant is not revocable for lack of consideration during
the time period specified in the offer. U.C.C. § 2-205. Likewise under § 2-209 an agreement
modifying a contract needs no consideration to be binding. In addition the development of an
expansive conception of the doctrine of promissory estoppel has made promises enforceable
without consideration in the interest of fairness. See G. Gilmore, supra note 43, at 57-73.
Professors Gabel and Feiman have suggested that the dominate ideology of contract has
switched from the freedom of contract notion of the 19th century to a notion of fairness in
contract. GABEL & FEIMAN, THE PoLITIcs OF LAW (1982).
50. The REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1934), whose chief draftsman was Pro-
fessor Beale of Harvard Law School, is the epitome of formalist ideology. It presents an ex-
haustive system of narrow rules which authoritatively direct specified results. There is no
room for discretionary judgment by judges or lawyers. There is no room for consideration of
social needs, or social values in the construction or application of rules. The emphasis is on the
orderly resolution of conflicts problems without concern for their social utility. Rules such as
lex loci delicti and lex contractus are to be invariably applied. The Restatement adopted this
formalist approach despite social-functional opposition by conflict scholars. See W. CooK,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); E. LORENZEN, SE-
LECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947) and Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of
the Law-Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933). In fact the Restatement's formalist philoso-
phy can be seen as an attempt to halt and derail the social-functional movement for change.
51. See, eg., Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); People v. One Ford
Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d
906 (1961). See also R. WEINTRAuB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 386-98
(1986); LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW, 309-11 (1977).
52. See, eg., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Burger
King Corp v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d
871.
53. These long-arm statutes obviously seek to reverse the strategic and economic advan-
tages that the territorial notion of jurisdiction has given to defendants. Because of the narrow
territorial interpretation often given to the "transacting any business" statutes, some states
have enacted specific provision to cover contracts made outside the forum where services or
goods are to be provided to people within the forum. A proper social-functional interpretation
of "transacting any business in the forum" would make the aforementioned statutes
unnecessary.
Another substantive area where changed substantive policy has
caused a change in jurisdictional policy is divorce law. These changes
also took place during the 1930s and 1940s.14 Restrictive and anachro-
nistic divorce laws of many states made divorce a very difficult and con-
tentious process, which exacerbated the emotional trauma and the
disruptive social effects associated with divorce."5 In order to obtain a
divorce and to avoid the hostile, contentious process, plaintiffs went to
other states where divorce laws were less restrictive and where the de-
fendant might not choose to appear.56 It was not unusual for a spouse
living in New York to travel to Nevada to obtain the benefit of Nevada's
lenient divorce law and short residence or domicile requirement. The
defendant-spouse who remained in New York would be given notice of
the divorce action and an opportunity to appear. Usually the defendant
did not appear, and under the jurisdictional doctrines no support order
or property settlement could be effective against the nonappearing
defendant.
5 7
In order for this type of social arrangement to be effective, it was
necessary to relax the due process jurisdictional requirements to allow
the forum to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. To accomplish this
social policy objective the Court analogized to the fiction of in rem juris-
diction.58 The res or thing before the forum court was the marriage per-
sonified in the plaintiff's presence in the forum state. Apparently the
plaintiff-spouse brought part of the marriage with her or him to the fo-
rum while part of the marriage remained with the defendant-spouse in
the other state. Here jurisdiction in the forum state is based primarily on
substantive policy considerations that again favor the plaintiff.59 Despite
this social-functional basis, the Court used the formalist in rem doctrine
in the language of its opinion in order to preserve the illusion that it was
following established formalist doctrine.
54. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
55. FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at 498-04.
56. Id
57. WEINTRAUB, supra note 51, at 248.
58. Williams, 317 U.S. at 297-99.
59. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce in the plaintiff-chosen forum flows from the change
from a divorce policy discouraging divorce to a policy of freely allowing divorce. See FRIED-
MAN, supra note 59. It is my contention that the substantive policy concerns play a critical
role in the determination of the forum's jurisdiction over the non resident defendant. Likewise
the determination not to allow a property settlement or a support order without personal juris-
diction over the defendant is essentially a substantive policy choice rather than a technical
procedural due process question. Conceptions of social policy and social policy concerns turn
out to be important considerations in the due process calculus.
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Particularly relevant to the radical change in jurisdiction wrought
by International Shoe is the change in due process as applied to choice of
law decisions by state courts. Prior to the revolutionary change in due
process, the Court, under the authority of the Due Process Clause and
the formalist approach championed by Professor Beale, had virtually re-
quired state courts to adhere to established rules of choice of law.' In
such cases as Allgeyer v. Louisiana,61 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lieb-
ing,62 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,63 and Hartford Accident and Indem-
nity Co. v. Dick,' the Court invalidated state court choices of law as
violative of the Due Process Clause. Such decisions were consistent with
the Court's conservative-formalist approach to due process during that
era. However, when the Court's approach to due process radically
changed in the 1930s to the social-functional mode, the Court's approach
to choice of law issues under the Due Process Clause accordingly
changed to a social-functional mode. In Alaska Packers Association v.
Industrial Accident Commission,65 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,66
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,67 Os-
born v. Ozlin,6" and Watson v. Employers Assurance Corp.,69 all of which
involved state court choices of law, the Court did what it had done in
other due process cases under the new approach. It empowered the state
courts to choose the law to apply in conflicts of law cases in which the
forum had a legitimate interest in the case and its outcome. Thus, choice
of law issues were treated like other due process cases in which the court
essentially deferred to state actions exercising regulatory power over
nonfundamental rights-that is, economic and property rights.
The choice of law cases under due process are important to the con-
textual understanding of International Shoe Co. v. Washington7° and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 71 because of the inextri-
cable relationship between choice of law and jurisdictional issues.
International Shoe and Mullane should be seen as establishing a rev-
olutionary social-functional paradigm of jurisdiction to supplant the for-
60. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 51, at 511-36.
61. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
62. 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
63. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
64. 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
65. 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
66. 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943).
67. 306 U.S. 493, 501-03 (1939).
68. 310 U.S. 53, 62-66 (1940).
69. 348 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1954).
70. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
71. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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malist-territorial paradigm of Pennoyer v. Neff'2 along with its fictitious
territorial offspring: in rem, quasi in rem, transient jurisdiction, presence,
and doing business. Viewed this way, International Shoe and Mullane
cannot be conveniently and comfortably understood as part of a gradual,
incremental evolutionary process that left room for the fictional, territo-
rial trappings of Pennoyer. International Shoe provided a new paradigm,
a revolutionary one, for jurisdictional theory.73
International Shoe and Mullane represented a break with the past
comparable to the Code Napoleon's attempts to free French law from the
socially restrictive pre-code law of France. International Shoe was a new
way of seeing, thinking about, and granting jurisdiction. Just as West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish threw off the fetters of the old formalist due pro-
cess methodology and allowed the states to implement their economic
and social objectives free of the formalist due process restraints of the
Lochner era,74 International Shoe Co. v. Washington empowered states to
effectuate their legitimate needs and interests through extraterritorial ju-
risdiction.75 Under this new paradigm, territorial limitations in the form
of state lines would be relatively insignificant and give way to the exigen-
cies of modem modes of living and doing business.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 76 is significant from
a social-functional perspective in two respects. First, Mullane made it
clear that notice and opportunity to be heard are questions separate from
jurisdiction.77 This opened the way for service of process outside state
territorial boundaries. Service of process is primarily notice-giving not
jurisdiction-conferring. Second, Mullane implicitly authorized the forum
to effectuate its needs and interests by exercising jurisdiction over nonres-
idents who have not purposely availed themselves of the benefits or pro-
tection of the forum.78 In Mullane, New York's need to finalize the trust
72. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
73. See generally Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REv.
703 (1984).
74. 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937).
75. 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945).
76. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
77. Id. at 312-13. Notice and opportunity to be heard is a separate due process category.
In prior cases notice and opportunity to be heard were tied together with jurisdiction since
service of process was often viewed as a jurisdiction-conferring event.
78. Id. In Mullane the holders of beneficial interests in the common trust being adminis-
tered in New York included beneficiaries who themselves, or through their agents, had directly
availed themselves of the benefits of the New York Common Trust statute and persons who
had succeeded to interests in the common trust by operation of law or by will. This latter
group can be characterized as having done nothing to avail themselves of the benefits of the
common trust. It might be said that they would not have contacts with New York. Yet the
Court implicitly allowed the New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over them in order that
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accounting process justified the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over nonresident beneficiaries of the common trust who had purposely
chosen to use the New York common trust arrangement and nonresident
holders of trust fund benefits who had not purposely chosen to partici-
pate in the New York common trust.79 The Court also allowed New
York to cut off the rights of nonresident beneficiaries whose whereabouts
were unknown and to whom actual notice could not be given."0 This is a
prime example of jurisdiction being based on forum need or interest.
Mullane was decided in 1950, just five years after International Shoe, and
together they plainly establish a social-functional standard where the fo-
rum's needs are the primary factor to be measured against any defend-
ant's interests under due process.
Even though the language of International Shoe was ambiguous and
could be interpreted as within the territorial paradigm, it is significant
that the Court went out of its way to announce the new social-functional
approach."' The Court could have reached the same result by validating
the Washington state court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Pennoyer-
oriented doctrines of presence or doing business. Instead, the Court de-
liberately chose to formulate a new standard and a new analytical frame-
work evaluating the constitutionality of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
new standard, consistent with the new standards of due process and fed-
eralism, empowered states to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents as
long as there were minimum contacts with the forum such that mainte-
nance of the suit did not "offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 2 In the majority opinion, the Court indicated that the
the New York court could effectively finalize the trust accounting process. This can be seen as
jurisdiction based on the forum need or interest and not on contacts initiated by the
beneficiaries.
79. It is my contention that the exercise of jurisdiction over those beneficiaries who had
not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits or protections of New York can only be
explained on the theory that such jurisdiction would be necessary to allow New York to be
able to expeditiously effectuate its policy and interest. In fact in the casebook, CoNFLICT OF
LAWS, supra note 39, the Mullane case is presented as an example ofjurisdiction by necessity.
See also Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity -An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
305 (1951).
80. Cutting off the interests of those beneficiaries whose whereabouts were not known is
an action which is again founded on the forum state's legitimate interest and need to expedi-
tiously administer its common trust policy. This reinforces the notion that jurisdiction is typi-
cally influenced by the forum's legitimate interest and need.
81. 326 U.S. 310. See Justice Black's concurring opinion in International Shoe in which
he states that he would reach the same result under current doctrines of presence or doing
business without creating a new natural law concept like "fairness." In this opinion, Justice
Black discloses his penchant for a formalist ideology in constitutional interpretation. Id at
323-26 (Black, J., concurring).
82. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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test for jurisdiction was not mechanical or quantitative but depended on
the quality of the defendant's activities as it correlates with the fair and
orderly administration of the law.83 The Court also stated that states
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if there are "no contacts,
ties, or relations."84
The crucial problem in unlocking the meaning of the standard an-
nounced in International Shoe is determining what legal and social con-
text should be used to implement its transformative message. Should the
verbal formulations of International Shoe be fit into the formalist mode
of interpreting, which would emphasize words, their literal meanings,
and the territorial framework of Pennoyer, or should the verbal formula-
tions be put into a broader social-functional framework, which would
look beyond words to social fact and the new due process and federalism
standards? The clash between the formalist and social-functional views
of law becomes both obvious and critical.
From the formalist perspective, the law is in the words and language
of the opinion.85 The formalist perspective discounts social and value
contexts. The emphasis is on legal certainty and stability. To achieve
certainty and stability, formalists insist that the law exists in the tangible
form of legal rules that are authoritative and forestall judicial policymak-
ing.86 Since legal rules are of this character, formalists must adhere to an
objective theory of language and cognition and an epistemological view
of society as a tangible entity that is essentially stable and homogene-
ous.87 Change, and particularly radical change, is threatening, disrup-
83. Id. at 319.
84. Id.
85. The formalist perspective, which prizes authoritative rules and worships certainty,
requires an authoritative theory of words and language. In order for rules to be certain, the
words used in the rules must have certain and definite meanings that readers must accept as
binding. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593,
606-15 (1958). It is necessary for the formalist to deny the contingency of language. The
social-functionalist takes the view that word meaning is contingent. It varies with context and
purpose. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law -A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 661-69 (1958). Fuller disagrees with Hart's notion of word meaning and suggests
that meaning is contextual and not standardized.
86. This is a statement of classic formalist ideology. Rules constrain and preempt judicial
policy creation. Judges and other law interpreters merely use "logic" to follow the rules.
87. The critical legal studies movement has launched a scathing attack on legal formal-
ism. Critical legal studies scholars have attacked the formalist conceptions of objective lan-
guage, cognition, and epistemology. The critical legal studies scholars have sought to
demonstrate that ideology permeates language, cognition, and epistemology. Not only is law
politics but language and epistemology are also politics. Legal rules and concepts are political
creatures and the result of political struggle. Language, cognition, and epistemology become
historically and politically contingent. See R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
1-41 (1986); HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD 22-55, 125-81 (1988).
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tive, and subversive."8 Changes, if they are to be tolerated, must be
gradual and slight. Moreover, changes in law are primarily in the hands
of the legislature, which is dominated by individuals of wealth and power
who will be counted on to maintain the status quo and resist change.8 9
Significant change would come about only when there is a social need
strong enough for the formalist to feel that to ignore it would lead to
social action that could undermine the existing system. For example, the
passage of the Wagner Act 9° in 1935, giving workers the right to act
collectively, organize unions, and bargain collectively, was possible be-
cause of widespread economic depression and the real possibility that a
workers' rebellion led by socialist or communist organizations might suc-
ceed in overthrowing the capitalist industrial establishment. 91 The Wag-
ner Act, from a formalist perspective, forestalled a radical change in
economic institutions and maintained the basic economic structure.
92
Essentially, the concept that a business is the private property of its
owner and that the shop, factory, or place of business is under the con-
trol of the owner has remained intact. Any changes were minor excep-
tions to this basic economic paradigm.
Thus, International Shoe from the formalist perspective would be
seen as making some exceptions to the still viable territorial paradigm of
Pennoyer. Established jurisdictional concepts and doctrines would
change as little as possible. Examining the cases between Pennoyer and
International Shoe from the formalist perspective leads to the conclusion
that the cases that did expand state court jurisdiction under such doc-
trines as in rem, quasi in rem, transient jurisdiction, implied consent,
doing business, and presence were rationalized as consistent with the
Pennoyer territorial paradigm. 93 Tensions between these doctrines and
88. See Kiare, Judicial De-radicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness 1937-1941, 62 MiNN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
89. It is well known that legislatures are made up of lawyers, businessmen, and profes-
sional persons who are generally well-to-do and who act to preserve their wealth, influence,
and economic advantages.
90. The Wagner Act was officially known as the National Labor Relations Act and was
amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act and in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act. The Wag-
ner Act was basically a bill of rights for employees and reversed the anti-labor bias of labor law
and the courts. It also outlawed certain unfair labor practices by employers and set up the
National Labor Relations Board to interpret and enforce the Act.
91. See ZiNN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 314-49 (1980).
92. See Klare, supra note 88, at 266-67, 281-84 (1978). See also Leonard, Foucault Gene-
alogy, Law Praxis, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 3, 14-15 (1990).
93. See, eg., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (implied consent); Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1908) (quasi-in-rem); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Milling and Mining
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (consent); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ins. Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S.
147 (1903) (doing business); Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 82 S.W. 1049 (1904)
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Pennoyer were ignored. The illusion of stability and certainty flowing
from the Pennoyer paradigm was preserved and the territorial paradigm
remained intact despite the need for changes based on social fact and
need.
From the realist or social-functional perspective, however, Interna-
tional Shoe constructed a new paradigm that would better serve the so-
cial needs and values of contemporary life and business. Under this view,
the meaning of International Shoe is to be determined by looking beyond
words and their dictionary meanings to social, legal, and value contexts.
Therefore, the formulations of International Shoe's minimum con-
tacts/fair-play standard, and "contacts, ties, or relations" should not be
burdened by territorially loaded concepts or terms. Instead, the Court
should develop this social-functional standard to serve the needs of our
modem federal system and allow the states to effectuate their needs
through extraterritorial jurisdictional actions. The phrase "contacts,
ties, or relations" should be given a functional interpretation not limited
to activities within the forum or actions outside the forum intentionally
causing effects in the forum. For example, in a case like Atkinson v. Su-
perior Court,94 in which California had a legitimate need to exercise juris-
diction over a trustee in New York who was receiving monies withheld
from California musicians but had no direct contacts with California, the
social-functional interpretation of International Shoe would allow Cali-
fornia to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the New York trustee.
Likewise, in multiparty actions where one of the parties is beyond the
reach of the territorially biased long-arm statutes or in interpleader situa-
tions, the forum with a legitimate need or interest in trying the case
would be able to do so under a social-functional rendition of Interna-
tional Shoe. Under this approach, social policy and state interest would
be of prime importance. Minimum contacts would not be artificially sep-
arated from fair play. Instead, under the social-functional approach, the
forum's interest, the plaintiff's interest, and substantive policy concerns
would be most significant. Only when the Court determined that the
defendant's interest should be characterized as a fundamental right
would the Court be likely to invalidate the forum's assertion of jurisdic-
tion under the Due Process Clause. Neither actions within the forum
nor tangible effects in the forum would be limiting factors under the Due
(transient jurisdiction); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71 (1908) (in
rem); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (presence).
94. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). Under a "contacts" dominated notion ofjurisdic-
tion there is considerable doubt about the California Court exercising jurisdiction over the
New York trustee. Under a social-functional conception of jurisdiction, however, there is little
doubt that California could exercise such jurisdiction over the New York trustee.
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Process Clause under the social-functional approach, as they seem to be
under the formalist application of the contacts standard. Under the so-
cial-functional approach, the state's extraterritorial reach would be lim-
ited only by individual fundamental rights of the defendant or by federal
interests of the type normally protected by the Commerce Clause.
II. Formalist Subversion of International Shoe
This portion of the Article deals with the method by which the Bur-
ger-Rehnquist Court has stealthily and insistently reinstated much of the
territorial formalism of jurisdiction in the language and rhetoric of a se-
ries of opinions that overruled state court assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. As suggested earlier in this Article, the Court's reinstate-
ment of territorial formalism must be seen as part of a comprehensive
scheme to return neutral formalism to its formerly dominant position in
constitutional discourse. At the same time, however, the Court contin-
ues to make social policy decisions based on its conservative notions of
social facts and values. The Court is not neutral, despite the appearance
of neutrality in its rhetoric. Even though the Court's jurisdictional opin-
ions seem technical, arcane, and without much social impact, these opin-
ions provide important insights into the Court's methodology and
ideology and evidence its larger movement toward formalism and away
from social-functionalism.
A subversion of the social-functional approach to jurisdiction enun-
ciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington95 and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co. 96 subtly and almost inevitably takes place
by operation of a phenomenon I call the "tyranny of concepts." By the
"tyranny of concepts" I mean the manner in which the traditional and
everyday ways of characterizing, seeing, and thinking about people,
things, and their interactions become so ingrained in us, so much a part
of us, that we tend to substitute our concepts for the actual people,
things, and events: in other words, the concepts become the reality.
97
The concepts we hold color and structure our perceptions of the real
world of people, things, and events to such an extent that we cannot
escape their dominance. 98 We have great difficulty seeing the world in
95. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
96. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
97. For the view that human reality is constituted and created by culturally induced con-
cepts and language, see HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 1-24 (1977); MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING
MEDIA (1964); SAPIR, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY (1949); WHORF, LAN-
GUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALrrY (1956).
98. See Wasserstrom, Postscript, Lawyers, and Revolutions, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 125
(1968); PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 272-79 (1974).
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fresh ways.
Pennoyer v. Neff s99 territorial jurisdiction concept completely colors
our understanding and application of jurisdictional doctrines in such a
way that we cannot see the social needs of our system and cannot accept
the new jurisdictional vision of International Shoe. Change, in a society
such as ours where the formalist notion of security and safety are built
into our very mode of existence,' ° ° is very threatening. We are taught
that safety and security require control over the things and people
around us. One method of controlling the world is to create neatly de-
fined concepts about the world and then rigidly hold on to them. Our
society's penchant for neat crisp definitions and our inflated notion of the
practical utility of such definitions in the processes of living and deciding
is the tyranny of concepts. Thus, the tyranny of concepts is that in a very
real sense we tend to be captives or prisoners of our conceptual perspec-
tives. Instead of concepts being social-functional tools we create to serve
us as needed, we tend to become the servants of our concepts. This role
reversal is dangerous if we as individuals and as a society are unable or
unwilling to adjust to changing social and economic conditions. 0 1 More
particularly, should we cling to a formalist territorial concept of jurisdic-
tion when it ceases to fit our social and economic modes of living?
Because of the tyranny of concepts and the conservative orientation
of our law and legal institutions,"0 2 new legal paradigms have a difficult
time gaining acceptance, depending in part on the degree to which the
old paradigm is recognized as causing serious social dislocation and dis-
ruption.'03 Since jurisdiction seems to be regarded as a dry, technical,
99. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
100. Security means keeping the appearance of order while masking the reality of change.
For example, we like to think that freedom of speech "means" the same thing that it did in
1792. We like to think that the "concept of negligence" means and operates the same way it
did in the nineteenth century. The formalist places his faith in neat, orderly concepts undis-
turbed by social change and reality.
101. For example, the formalist conception of contract developed by Holmes, Langdell,
and Williston still dominates our notions of contract even though it is out of step with the way
we behave in contractual relations. The hard-bargained-for notion of contract where parties
sit down and freely negotiate all the contractual terms and then reduce the contract to an
objective writing is our model. This remains so even though experience and empirical investi-
gation indicates that most "contracts" are not accomplished in this pristine fashion.
102. See Wasserstrom, supra note 98, at 125, 129. Wasserstrom argues that law is a con-
servative institution (like language) that attempts to push our experience into past conceptual
frameworks or categories.
103. An example of this notion can be seen in the establishment of a new paradigm in
Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) where the old equal protection paradigm of
"separate but equal" was discarded and replaced with the new equal protection paradigm that
outlawed official racial segregation. One may potentially argue that even though there had
been repeated attempts to invalidate state imposed segregation, it was not until there was the
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legal matter, the movement toward the new paradigm of International
Shoe does not enjoy widespread social support. Thus, one could expect
that judicial change would be difficult.
The new jurisdictional paradigm of International Shoe was destined
to encounter resistance. Conservative formalist forces could interpret the
open texture1" of its language and format in a way that gave effect to
territorial notions. The same language can be interpreted by others to
give effect to the social-functional vision of International Shoe.10
In the years following International Shoe and Mullane, there was a
proliferation of long-arm statutes across the nation. The early Illinois
long-arm statute became a prototype." 6 This statute provided for juris-
diction in Illinois state courts where a nonresident transacted any busi-
ness in Illinois, committed a tortious act in Illinois, owned, used, or
possessed property in Illinois, or contracted to insure persons or property
in Illinois." 7 Under this statute, jurisdiction was limited to causes of
action that arose out of the above enumerated acts.108 It also provided
for service of process outside Illinois."°9 A critical look at this statute
and statutes patterned after it shows that they bear the indelible imprint
of the pre-International Shoe territorial concept. All of the provisions
require acts done physically within the territorial limits of the forum
threat of serious widespread racial violence and agitation for change that the old paradigm was
replaced by the new one. Likewise, in the labor law area, it was a combination of labor unrest
caused by the Great Depression and the socialists clamoring for a revolutionary change in the
institutions of industrial ownership that prompted a change in labor law that recognized the
employees right to combine their economic power by organizing, striking and bargaining col-
lectively. Up until 1935, when the Wagner Act was passed, these rights and been denied to
workers by the legal regime.
104. The term "open texture" of legal language has been used by H.L.A. Hart, a moderate
formalist, to suggest that language does have inherent ambiguities which must be resolved in
difficult cases by resort to social fact and social values. Nevertheless in typical formalist fash-
ion, he insists that in most cases standardized meanings are apparent. See H. HART, CONCEPT
OF LAW 121-50 (1961); Hart, supra note 85, at 606-08 (1958) in which he discusses the notion
of core and penumbra meanings.
105. Social-functionalists look beyond "literal" meaning to the social context out of which
International Shoe came. International Shoe's social purpose was to allow state courts to have
jurisdiction over nonresidents where there would be a legitimate need. The formalist notion of
state lines as barriers are not of primary concern. For a discussion of a social-functional view
of interpretation see Fuller, supra note 85, at 661-69 (1958), in which Fuller criticizes Hart's
idea of core and penumbra meanings and suggests the proper approach to meaning is through
the notion of social purpose.
106. See Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm Statute 1963 ILL. L. FORM 533. See also The
UrNF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L PROCEDURE ACT, 9B U.L.A 307 (1966) which was based upon
the Illinois Act. For a discussion of different types of long-arm statutes see Welkowitz, Going
to the Limits of Due Process Myth, Mystique and Meaning, 28 DUQ. L. REv. 233 (1990).
107. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17.
108. Id. at § 17(1).
109. Id at § 17(2).
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state. Though these statutes moved somewhat beyond the pre-Interna-
tional Shoe doctrines, such as doing business, implied consent, and pres-
ence, they did not approach the due process limits that a fully social-
functional approach to jurisdiction might establish. 110 A state long-arm
statute pushing due process limits would provide that the forum courts
would have jurisdiction over non-resident defendants where the state has
a substantial interest or need to exercise such jurisdiction.
Some state legislatures, perhaps more aware of the social-functional
vision of International Shoe, passed long-arm statutes that provided that
their courts could exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis not
inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution."1 ' Such open-ended statutes
that did not specify particular situations would be objectional to formal-
ist jurists and scholars because of their apparent lack of certainty and
authoritative direction. 1 2 However, it was clear that the enumerated-
acts statutes left serious gaps in jurisdictional coverage and did not meet
the social needs of our modem society." 3 On the other hand, social-func-
tional jurists and scholars would approve of the use of what might be
termed a standard'14 that would allow for flexibility, adjustment, and
110. A fully social-functional jurisdictional statute would be framed in terms that allow a
state court to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when it would effectuate a legitimate state
need or interest. The limits on such a statute would be in the form of fundamental rights or
federal interests.
11. See Welkowitz, supra note 106, at 237-40. According to Welkowitz six states have
statutes which allow jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the federal constitution or state
constitution.
112. Formalist judges are not supposed to make law (or policy). They are to follow the
literal meaning of statutes. Formalist judges might also object to such statues because they
infer the obliteration of state lines and interfere with the alleged sovereignty of other states.
113. For example, the "tortious act within the state" was often interpreted narrowly (in a
formalist mode) so that it did not apply to cases where the defendant acted outside the state
but the injury occurred inside the state. See Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d
68 (1965); Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
Courts had difficulty applying the "transacting any business in the state" section to con-
tracts made outside the state that called for delivery or performance within the state. Feathers,
15 N.Y.2d at 454, 209 N.E.2d at 79. The courts also had a problem with the notion that a
single act in the forum was significant enough to be "transacting any business." Here, the
problem was that the courts wanted to equate "transacting any business" with the territorial
concept of "doing business." See Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 16 Ill.2d 426, 434, 158
N.E.2d 73, 79 (1959), in which the Illinois court said it did not have jurisdiction over the Addo
Machine Co., which was domiciled in New York and shipped machines to Illinois purchasers.
The Illinois court said that Addo had no offices or employees in Illinois and that the sales were
made in New York when Addo received and accepted orders for machines. Id at 436-37, 158
N.E.2d at 79. The court was applying the old territorial notion of doing business instead of the
new social-functional jurisdiction.
114. The notion that law is to be found in "standards" and not "rules" is a social-func-
tional one. Standards are not directive in form. They merely give the court the factors or
considerations that are relevant and it is up to the court to weigh, balance, or accommodate
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critical social judgment by the courts. Needless to say, most states opted
for the approach taken by the Illinois statute,115 which was still an essen-
tially formalist artifact that did allow some improvement in jurisdictional
praxis. Such statutes demonstrate the shackling conservative effect of the
tyranny of concepts. The new paradigm was not accepted but was
adapted for use within the territorial paradigm offered by Pennoyer."6
Some realignments and adjustments were made, but the territorial con-
ception of jurisdiction remained very much intact.
Later experience exposed some of the social-functional weaknesses
of the Illinois statute. 17 What was to be done when the defendant com-
mitted tortious acts or made contractual arrangements outside the fo-
rum? State courts wrestled with these problems, sometimes finding
jurisdiction and sometimes not.' The more formalist and territorial a
court's perspective, the more likely the statute would not be applied to
acts outside the forum. The more social-functional the court's perspec-
tive, the more likely the statute would be construed to apply to actions
outside the forum.
Some states, in order to provide a formalist territorial base, amended
the long-arm statute to cover tortious acts outside the forum where the
effect or injury was within the forum and contractual arrangements made
outside the forum provided for performance within the forum.'1 9 Even
in these situations the focus was on tangible physical effects within the
forum. The territorial perspective of Pennoyer was still very much in
the interests with these considerations in mind. For example, the Free Exercise Clause is not a
rule. Rather, it provides a standard under which the court makes an evaluative judgment.
Thus, if a claimant's free exercise "right" ("interest") is infringed by the state action, the state
may justify such an infringement by proving a compelling interest to infringe the right. The
court first makes a qualitative evaluative judgment as to whether there is an infringement. If
the court determines that there is an infringement, then they must make a qualitative, evalua-
tive judgment as to whether the state's interest is compelling enough to justify the infringe-
ment. Under the Due Process Clause and fundamental rights clauses we characteristically
speak of standards not rules. See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987), in which he links the notion of standards to the social-functional approach to law. See
also Kennedy, Form and Substance in Pivate Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1702-13 (1976) (suggesting that the choice between rules and standards requires an investiga-
tion of both the values intrinsic to form and the values we choose to achieve through them).
115. See Welkowitz, supra note 106, at 237.
116. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
117. See infra note 118.
118. In supra note 113, I cited two cases where the Court refused a social-functional appli-
cation of the long-arm statues. A case which illustrates a court finding jurisdiction under a
type of social-functional approach is the much publicized Gray v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also Welkowitz, supra note
106, at 255-66 (discussing analyses of different long-arm statutes).
119. For example, see OHIO REV. CODE tit. 23, § 2307.382 (A)(3)-(A)(4) (Anderson 1981).
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evidence. In fact, some of these amendments required that tortious acts
or contractual arrangements outside the forum would subject the nonres-
idents to jurisdiction only if they regularly did or solicited business in the
forum, or derived substantial revenues from goods used or services ren-
dered in the forum.12° Why did legislatures feel the necessity to require
regular business or substantial revenues? The answer lies again in the
continued existence and ubiquitous effects of the territorial paradigm.
State lines remained significant barriers in jurisdictional theory and prac-
tice even though in the conduct of our social and economic affairs they
were of little consequence.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,121 rendered thirty-
five years after International Shoe's social-functional paradigm was prof-
fered, the formalist territorial perspective was revealed. The Court re-
jected the stream of commerce (social-functional) concept and insisted on
a jurisdictional vision that reinstated state lines as formidable jurisdic-
tional barriers and reinvigorated the old formalist federalism notions. 122
The Court stated that state lines must mean something and incorporated
federalism concerns into the due process equation.123 In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Oklahoma long-arm statute under which Oklahoma ex-
ercised jurisdiction over the New York retailer and the regional distribu-
tor governed tortious acts or omissions outside the forum that caused
injury in the forum, but the statute also required regular business or so-
licitation in the forum or substantial revenues from goods used in the
forum. The tortious act or omission was done in New York by the sale
of a defective auto to the plaintiffs in New York. Apparently, the criti-
cal issue was whether these nonresident defendants conducted business in
Oklahoma or received substantial revenues from autos used in
Oklahoma. 24 The Court found no minimum contacts because the de-
fendants did not sell autos in Oklahoma or receive substantial revenues
from autos used in Oklahoma.12 Because of the Court's bifurcation of
120. The Oklahoma long-arm statute at issue in World-Wide Volkswagen was such a stat-
ute. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1701.03 (a)(4) (West 1961).
121. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
122. Id. at 293.
123. Id.
124. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, emphasized that the defend-
ant, the New York retailer, made no sales in Oklahoma and performed no services in
Oklahoma. Likewise the Court said the retailer solicited no business through advertising or
salespersons in Oklahoma nor did they sell cars regularly to Oklahoma customers. In short,
the defendant didn't do business in Oklahoma or receive profits from autos used in Oklahoma.
This type of analysis is like the pre-International Shoe analysis under the doing business doc-
trine and is territorially oriented. It is not social-functional analysis under International Shoe
and Mullane.
125. Id at 295.
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minimum contacts and fairness, the Court never really addressed the
fairness issue, which involves a social-functional analysis that focuses on
the forum's needs and interests. The opinion emphasized federalism con-
cerns and the continued jurisdictional barrier significance of state
lines.12 6 In its attempt to reconcile World- Wide Volkswagen with Inter-
national Shoe, the Court concluded that "petitioners have no contacts,
ties, or relations" with Oklahoma. 27 World- Wide goes beyond the sub-
tle psychological compulsion of the tyranny of concepts to an overt, in-
tentional rejection of the social-functional International Shoe paradigm.
The agenda of reinstatement of the formalist territorial notion ofjurisdic-
tion became conscious and avowed.
The methodology used in the formalist subversion of the Interna-
tional Shoe paradigm is the familiar ploy of separating inextricably inter-
related matters into different categories so that they can be handled
differently without any conscious recognition of the interrelationship of
the new concepts thus separated and created. This, of course, is the same
mode of operation that was followed in Pennoyer with the artificial sepa-
ration of in personam and in rem jurisdiction.128 Such action is typical in
the linear, compartmentalized, reductionist thinking employed in the for-
malist model of law and legal institutions. Reductionism in jurisdictional
jurisprudence results in the critical separation of the inextricably inter-
woven. Choice of law and jurisdiction are treated as separate categories.
Procedural due process is separated and distinguished from substantive
due process. Contacts, with their purposeful availment baggage, are sep-
arated from the fairness aspect of the International Shoe standard.
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court insisted on the separation of choice
126. The Court's emphasis on federalism as an important factor under the International
Shoe approach functions as a way to re-establish the barrier significance of state lines. More-
over, federalism is not a factor in due process standards which pit state interests against indi-
vidual interests. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (White, J. writing for the majority).
In addition it is hard to see how the exercise of jurisdiction by the Oklahoma courts would
have any deleterious effect on the interests of any other state, including New York. Under a
social-functional approach, merely raising the specter of interference with another state's con-
cerns is not sufficient. One must demonstrate the actual and real impact on the interests of the
state in order for this type of argument to have any credence.
127. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299.
128. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), the Court denied the Oregon Court's in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant because personal service could not be made on the
non-resident defendant outside the territorial limits of the state of Oregon. The plaintiff could
have brought an in rem action, however, by attaching defendant's real property in Oregon. The
latter action was constitutional because Oregon would have jurisdictional power over things
within the territorial boundaries of Oregon. The Court treated the in personam action and the
in rem action as separate and distinct categories even though they were functionally inconsis-
tent with each other.
of law issues and jurisdictional issues under due process. 129 This was
necessary since the Court had adopted a rational basis, social-functional
standard in regard to choice of law issues. Under this approach Florida
would have had a legitimate interest in applying its law to the facts of the
case. The application of Florida law, however, would have invalidated
the settlor-testator's intentions under her trust and will arrangements.
Such a result would have been blatantly unfair and contrary to current
trends in trust law and choice of law in regard to trust matters. 130 Since
the use of due process to prevent application of Florida's law was fore-
closed, the Court had to distinguish jurisdictional due process issues
from choice of law issues. The Court has consistently held to this fateful
distinction since Hanson.
The Court also activated the substantive due process/procedural
due process dichotomy. Choice of law is seen as involving substantive
due process standards, while jurisdiction is seen as involving procedural
due process standards that give the Court more room to operate and a
way to invalidate state assertions of substantive policy concerns."'1 Pro-
cedural due process seemingly involves a different mode of accommodat-
ing state and individual interests. Procedural due process has its own
peculiar set of considerations that clearly call for different methods and
results. Thus jurisdiction becomes a part of procedural fair play with its
own distinctive standards. Since jurisdiction is procedural and not sub-
stantive, the Court can more freely substitute its wisdom for that of the
state court, legislature, or agency. Somehow, interfering in procedural
policies of the state is on a different plane from interfering with substan-
tive policies of the state. While the social-functionalist would assert that
procedural rules are based on substantive policy notions, formalists seem
to be satisfied that procedure and substance are intrinsically different.
Moreover, countless examples show that the courts play characteriza-
tion games with the substance/procedure dichotomy in order to reach
129. 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
130. The result would have been unfair because the two aunts of the beneficiary would be
getting the money contrary to the settlor-testator's wishes after the settlor-testator had amply
provided for the two aunts under the will.
In current choice of law policy the trend is and was to choose the law which would
validate the trust and its purposes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW
§ 270 (1971). R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW 384-86 (3d ed. 1977).
131. Under substantive due process the Court works within the fundamental/non-funda-
mental rights social-functional standard. Under procedural due process the Court is not bur-
dened by the fundamental/non-fundamental analysis and is free to evaluate interests as they
choose and deal with state and individual interests on an ad hoc basis. See discussion of the
new property cases, infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
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desired results. 32
In the area of conflicts of law, one classic way the forum court
could evade the strictures of the traditional choice of law rules and apply
forum law was by characterizing the law of the foreign jurisdiction as
procedural rather than substantive.'33 Under traditional formalist choice
of law rules, the forum was not required to apply the procedural law of
another jurisdiction.' Therefore, the forum court was free to apply fo-
rum procedural law that coincidentally allowed a different result. From
a social-functional perspective it is clear that the forum courts were using
the substance/procedure dichotomy to allow the court, for what it con-
siders good social policy reasons, to treat similar and analogous situa-
tions differently.
Similarly, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court played the
substantive due process/procedural due process gambit in what were
termed "the new property cases."' 35 In the new property cases, the
Court protected interests that on the surface seemed to be nonfunda-
mental economic interests by invoking the metaphysical magic of proce-
dural due process. The Court, cognizant of the unfairness and
exploitation of the state policies in these cases, was faced with a dilemma.
If it interfered with the state policies concerning these arguably
nonfundamental economic interests, it would seem to be acting inconsis-
tently with its rational basis standard. On the other hand, if the Court
chose to characterize the interests asserted as fundamental interests it
would be greatly expanding the fundamental interests category and
would be opening the door to individuals to raise claims that would
greatly hamper the states' powers to regulate economic interests. The
132. See the cases involving application of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) in which
federal courts apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. See also W. CoOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW 154-93 (Harvard Studies in the Con-
flict of Laws vol. 5, 1942).
133. See CRAMPTON, CURRIE & KAY, supra note 39, at 94-117 (1987) (describing the use
of the substance/procedure dichotomy by courts to evade application of the traditional choice
of law rules).
134. Id.
135. "The new property cases" were cases decided in the 1960s and early 1970s where the
Court, primarily the Warren Court, sought to protect property and economic rights from op-
pressive state actions by characterizing the interest as a property interest protected by proce-
dural due process. In most cases, the Court protected the property interests by saying that
they could not be interfered with without a hearing. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wisconsin v. Constantinean, 400 U.S.
433 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). See generally Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property". Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. Rnv. 445 (1977); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 401 (1977).
Court in sterling political fashion refused to take either of the above ac-
tions. Instead, it said that what was involved was procedural due process
and that the Court was requiring the states to follow fair procedures, as
defined by the Court, in dealing with these nonfundamental interests.136
After all, procedural due process is a separate category that raises dis-
tinctive questions. It was not long, however, before the Court closed the
door on this method of challenging state actions, 37 apparently becoming
self-conscious of this mode of action and its incompatibility or tension
with substantive due process standards and the problems its procedural
characterization created for state regulatory concerns.1 38  The Court
served notice that it would not use procedural due process to undermine
its policy of deference to state policy choices where nonfundamental in-
terests were involved.
1 39
An example of the use of procedural due process in the new prop-
erty cases to protect economic interests is found in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.."4 In Sniadach, the Court struck down Wisconsin's wage
garnishment policy on the grounds that the wage earner was deprived of
property-his or her paycheck-without a hearing before a judicial of-
ficer, which of course was a violation of procedural due process. Under
this approach, the Court did not have to worry about how to character-
ize the wage earner's interest as fundamental or nonfundamental. The
Court was free to judge that this method of proceeding was unfair and
exploitive. The Court was free to use an open balancing approach in
which it creates the interests to be balanced and their correlative values
in the context of fair procedure.
Likewise, in Goldberg v. Kelly,14 the welfare recipient's interest in
receiving his or her benefits check, which is not adequate to buy basic
necessities, might have been deemed fundamental, thereby requiring the
state to justify its action or policy by a compelling state interest. Instead
136. For example, in Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337, the Court chose to say that the interest of the
debtor being infringed was a right to a hearing (a procedural due process right) before being
deprived of the use of his wages by the Wisconsin garnishment procedures. An alternate mode
of characterizing the interest would be that a working man's interest in his wages is a funda-
mental interest that could not be interfered with except by the state demonstrating a compel-
ling interest served by infringement upon the fundamental interest.
137. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
138. See, eg., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Mitchell
v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Van Al-
styne, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
141. 397 U.S. 254.
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the Court chose to invalidate the New York procedural policies, which
had treated welfare recipients' needs and interests in a humanistically
demeaning fashion, under the rubric of procedural due process. 142 The
impact on New York and other states was substantial and caused them to
alter and change their attitude toward welfare recipients' interests.
1 43
Again the rhetoric was procedural, but the impact and effects were sub-
stantive. Procedural due process was used to mask the substantive char-
acter of the Court's action.
Similarly, during the 1970s, in Stanley v. Illinois,1" Viandis v.
Kline,145 and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,1 46 the Court
again used procedural due process to achieve substantive aims and to
prevent states from regulating certain interests not deemed to be funda-
mental in unfair and oppressive ways. The mechanism used in these
cases was the introduction of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
which invalidated state policies ostensibly on the basis that they violated
procedural due process notions. 47 In each of these cases the Court re-
142. In New York, as well as other states, welfare recipients' interest have always been
treated shabbily, capriciously, casually, and paternalistically. New York procedures allowed
welfare benefits to be terminated without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The decision
would be made by the caseworker without input by the recipient. This is some evidence of
how the recipients' interest were treated in a cavalier fashion. The Court in Goldberg held that
a welfare recipient's benefits could not be terminated without notice and an evidentiary hear-
ing. The Court again chose to use procedural due process to protect the recipient's interest in
having funds to buy the necessaries of life and existence, i.e. for shelter, and clothing. Such an
interest might be deemed fundamental and such arguments were suggested. Yet, the Court
preferred not to treat the case as involving a fundamental substantive interest.
For an interesting presentation of how welfare systems operate as a degrading system of
social control, see SKOLNICK & CURRIE, CRISIS IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 453-70 (7th Ed.
1988). For a discussion of how welfare recipient's interests are degradingly treated, see Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1265 (1965).
143. The decision in Goldberg had a great impact on welfare systems by not only requiring
procedural changes but also requiring state welfare organizations to re-think their attitudes
toward the welfare recipient's interest. Goldberg had both a procedural and substantive effect.
See MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 32-36 (1985) for a statement
about the substantial effect of Goldberg on state welfare systems. See also Mashaw, The Man-
agement Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accu-
racy and Fairness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L.Q. 772 (1974).
144. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court required the state to notify an unmarried father that
his child was going to be adopted and to give him an opportunity to be heard on this matter.
145. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that deprived a
nonresident student at a Connecticut state college, after he had been in the school for one year,
of a hearing which would allow him opportunity to prove he was now a Connecticut resident
and entitled to the lower resident tuition rate.
146. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Court invalidated Cleveland Board of Education rules that
required pregnant teachers to take leave without pay at least five months before the expected
date of birth using the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.
147. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine was short-lived. It was used by the Burger
Court in the early 1970s to protect certain interests from unreasonable state regulation without
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fused to formally characterize the individual interests asserted as funda-
mental interests. Instead, for political reasons,148 the Court chose to
handle these cases under the procedural due process category, which
avoided the social-functional standards of substantive due process.
The relevant point in these cases for this paper is that the Court has
continually and persistently used the substantive due process/procedural
due process dichotomy to avoid the social-functional due process stan-
dards developed in the 1930s and 1940s. More particularly, the Court, in
jurisdictional due process cases, has used this same characterization
game to avoid and derail the social-fumctional approach of International
Shoe. The Court through this ploy has been able to substitute its own
reactionary notions of federalism149 under which state lines become
strong, antifunctional barriers to jurisdiction under the social-functional
standards of International Shoe v. Washington. 5 The irony here is that
conservative notions of federalism, instead of protecting powers of the
states, very often hamper states' attempts to effectuate their legitimate
needs and interests in the modem era.151
An equally important characterization game is played when the
Court chooses to separate minimum contacts from fair play in the Inter-
national Shoe standard. The Court plays cavalierly with the social-func-
tional due process standards adumbrated in International Shoe and in the
other 1930s and 1940s cases. Under these due process standards the
state's need or interest is a primary factor in all due process calculations.
More particularly, the state's legitimate need or interest is always associ-
having to expand the fundamental rights categories. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine
was seen as a type of procedural due process that freed the Court from the substantive funda-
mental rights/nonfundamental rights standards. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534, 1544-49 (1974).
148. By political reasons, I mean the Court was moved by value and policy concerns rather
than technical legal requirements. The court made substantive value choices under the pretext
of procedural due process under the beguiling irrebuttable presumption.
149. Through its procedural due process characterization of jurisdiction, the Court has
been able to reinstate the old territorial notions of state power and federalism. The Court
merely assumes that extraterritorial jurisdiction interferes with the "sovereignty" of other
states and that state lines are necessary barriers to protect state sovereignty.
150. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
151. It was Brainerd Currie who pointed out the irony of an interested forum state apply-
ing the policy of another state, which was often disinterested, because of the socially insensitive
traditional rules of choice of law. To do this was to allow the state of injury or of contracting
to interfere with the forum state's legitimate concerns. Under Currie's interest analysis, an
interested forum state need not defer to the real or imagined interests of the state of injury or
of contracting. The underlying truth was that the traditional rules of choice of law often
required an invasion of the forum's sovereignty. The same type of argument applies to juris-
diction situations. Why should the forum state subordinate its legitimate needs or interests to
that of another state as required by the territorial jurisdiction paradigm?
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ated with the individual interest being asserted under due process. The
state and individual interests are not considered separately. By separat-
ing the notion of the defendant's contacts from the state interest and
fairness consideration's the Court confounds the usual due process meth-
odology. The critical or pivotal issue in the jurisdiction cases becomes
whether or not there are minimum contacts.
In typical formalist fashion, contacts either exist or they do not ex-
ist. Contacts are seen as discrete entities with defined, inherent charac-
teristics that can be objectively perceived. Under this view, the
determination of whether or not there are minimum contacts does not
involve judging substantive policy concerns. Typically when the Court
invalidates the state's jurisdictional assertion it does so on the grounds
that there are no contacts.152 Thus, there is no need to even reach fair-
ness concerns, state interests, or substantive policy. In Hanson v.
Denckla, 53 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 5 Rush v. Savchuk,1"
Kulko v. Superior Court,1 56 and Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior
Court,1 -5 7 there were no contacts, and in Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall,15 there were some contacts but not enough to meet
the minimum contacts test. This of course is the same rhetorical method
used by the Court in the choice of law cases under due process. 159 On
the surface it looks neat and neutral. The Court gives the impression
that it is making objective judgments and not policy judgments. The
Court is merely acting out the familiar formalist version of the judicial
role. A critical analysis suggests, however, that in each of the above
cases the conclusion of a lack of contacts was in essence a policy decision,
and that, from a social-functional perspective there were sufficient rela-
tionships between the forum's interest or need and the defendant to meet
International Shoe's requirement of "contacts, ties, or relations." 160
152. The Court has adopted the same type of due process approach that it uses in the
choice of law cases. In the choice of law cases the Court strikes down state court choices of
law where they decide that there are no contacts with the forum state. If the Court finds that
there are contacts, the forum's choice of law is usually upheld.
153. 327 U.S. 235 (1957).
154. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
155. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
156. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
157. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
158. 466 U.S. 408 (1983).
159. See supra note 106.
160. From a social-functional perspective the phrase "contacts, ties, or relations" is not
limited to actions by the defendant to purposefully avail himself of the benefits or protections
of the forum state's law. The primary focus is on the forum state's interest or need and there
can be a relationship with the forum without acts of purposeful availment by the defendant.
In Kulko, the defendant-father allowed or acquiesced in the
mother's custody of the children in her newly acquired residence in Cali-
fornia. The support arrangements under the separation agreement were
obviously inadequate now that the children would be living full-time
with their mother. California had an interest in seeing that the children
were properly supported by the father and had a legitimate interest in
applying its substantive policy in the California courts.161 In a social-
functional sense, it is clear that there were sufficient contacts between the
defendant and California to satisfy International Shoe's standards. Mr.
Kulko was part of a living arrangement and social institutional pattern of
modern living that requires such jurisdictional assertions. State lines
should not pose barriers to the enforcement of his responsibilities in this
type of situation.
Likewise, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court declared that the
defendant, a New York retailer of Audi automobiles, had no contacts
with Oklahoma, the forum state and the site of the accident and in-
jury.162 Here again, the Court could have found the necessary contacts
factually if it chose to implement the social-functional vision of Interna-
tional Shoe. The plaintiff-oriented substantive realities of products liabil-
ity, the interstate character of the auto industry, and the injury in the
forum, which involved local medical service providers, would combine to
satisfy a social-functional conception of minimum contacts and fair play.
Similarly, critical analysis of Rush, Helicopteros, and Asahi reveals
that in each of these cases the requisite minimum contacts could have
been found if the Court chose to adopt a social-functional perspective.
The no contacts conclusions of these cases are used to obscure the policy
basis for its denial of jurisdiction and to preserve the Court's power to
police choice of law decisions by state courts under the jurisdictional
characterization. This tactic tends to confuse due process standards and
jurisdictional theory. '63 Rush really involved the imposition of formalist
territorial notions of federalism and a denial of the reality of plaintiff-
oriented tort policy that has affected our notions of jurisdiction. 
16
161. Kulko, 463 U.S. at 98.
162. 444 U.S. at 289.
163. The confusion follows from such action by the Court because there is a tension be-
tween what the Court says and what it does. The Court's rhetoric of contacts and its charac-
terization of jurisdiction as procedural due process tends to mislead practitioners and scholars.
The Court's rhetoric forestalls the development of social-functional, policy effectuating
jurisdiction.
164. In Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the plaintiff was injured in a single car
accident in Indiana. The car was driven by the defendant's son. At the time of the accident all
parties resided in Indiana. Indiana had a guest statute that made the driver liable to an injured
passenger only if the driver was guilty of gross negligence. The plaintiff's family moved to
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Helicopteros and Asahi really involved policy concerns about possible in-
terference with federal interests protected by the Foreign Commerce
Clause and the foreign affairs power of the federal government through
the imposition of our tort policies on defendants from foreign countries
whose tort policies are likely to be different from ours.16 In these cases,
the actual bases for denial of jurisdiction are not to be found in whether
contacts exist but in the policy considerations that the Court denies are
part of the contacts inquiry.
From the social-functional perspective, contacts should be qualita-
tive, but they have become quantitative territorialist constructs that are
used by the Burger-Rehnquist Court to impose a territorialist perspective
on jurisdictional theory. Contacts as conceived by the Burger-Rehnquist
Court take on a territorialist hue in the same way that the post-Pennoyer
concepts of doing business, implied consent, and quasi in rem did.166
Contacts are seen primarily in terms of physical acts done by the nonresi-
dent defendant either inside the forum state or purposefully directed to-
ward state residents in some tangible way. In accord with typical
formalist thinking, contacts are thought of as concrete, with acts inside
the forum state as the prototype. The Court's reification of the contacts
concept subtly incorporates territorialist notions into the International
Shoe standards. Because of the primary emphasis on contacts as a basic
threshold concept, the Court is able to impose its territorial bias at the
critical point in its due process analysis. This is a significant method by
which the Court subverts the social-functional vision of International
Shoe and Mullane and reinstates the formalist rhetoric in jurisdictional
theory.
In this contacts-dominated rhetoric there is, at least on the surface,
little room for social-functional considerations. The Court has taken the
phrase, "contacts, ties, or relations" and converted it into a factual, terri-
torial notion. There is no conscious recognition by the Court that the
phrase might have a broader social-functional meaning tied to legitimate
forum interests, social policy, and social value and that it does not re-
quire acts in the forum or acts purposely directed toward the persons or
property in the forum.
Minnesota a year and a half after the accident. One year later the plaintiff fied suit in
Minnesota.
165. See Asahi, supra note 12, at 115-16. See also Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction
in International Cases, 17 Ga. J. Int'l and Comp. L. 1 (1987).
166. The concepts of doing business, implied consent, and quasi in rem were formally con-
structed as consistent with the territorial view of jurisdiction despite their obvious tension with
the territorial paradigm. The contacts notion had been construed in the same territorial
fashion.
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A fully social-functional understanding and application of this
phrase would give effect to the forum's needs and interests, current
modes of living, and current ideas about social policy. Such a perspective
would also do away with the "purposeful availment" notion, which has
its roots in pre-International Shoe ideology where formalist reasons were
developed to create jurisdiction over foreign corporations that were reap-
ing profits from the forum. 167 The rhetorical posture of this approach
adapted these extraterritorial assertions to the Pennoyer territorial para-
digm. There was no conscious or explicit attempt to develop a truly so-
cial-functional paradigm.
In addition, the purposeful availment doctrine was developed in a
commercial context involving foreign corporations or businesses. The
doctrine as developed does not fit well in other social settings. For exam-
ple, the doctrine seems out of place in cases like Kulko v. Superior
Court168 that involve child support and custody. It is interesting to note
that in divorce actions a nonresident spouse is subject to forum jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of divorce even though he or she has no "contacts"
with the forum state where the plaintiff-spouse has unilaterally set up
residence.1 69 The purposeful availment doctrine also seems to be out of
place in plaintiff-oriented tort cases involving personal injury, such as
products liability cases and auto accident cases like Rush v. Savchuk,
170
where social policy concerns for proper compensation are of central
importance.
167. The purposeful availment doctrine grows out of the territorial paradigm as a way of
justifying a breach in or exception to the territorial paradigm. It is fair because the defendant
is getting some kind of benefit, e.g., making profits from sales. However, the approach is
inconsistent with a social-functional model which centers on the forum state's legitimate need
and on substantive social policy concerns.
168. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko, California's interest in proper support of children now
living in California combined with the social reality that this is a very typical domestic situa-
tion should have been sufficient to satisfy the notion that there were "ties or relationships"
present.
169. It seems paradoxical that the forum can affect the non-resident's marriage interest by
severing the marriage while the forum cannot affect the non-resident's property interest with
"personal" jurisdiction. Are not the defendant's interest in his/her marriage as important as
his/her interest in property?
170. 444 U.S. 320. Rush is the type of case that comes up because of tension between a
social-functional approach to tort which has become plaintiff-oriented and the regressive terri-
torial view of jurisdiction that dominates jurisdictional thinking. The Court's refusal to see the
insurance carrier, State Farm, as the real party in interest is a denial of the change to a plain-
tiff-oriented approach in tort law. By focusing on the defendant as the real party in interest,
the Court is affirming its reactionary belief in a defendant-oriented tort law and in a defendant-
oriented jurisdictional paradigm. The Court made it clear that the plaintiff-oriented jurisdic-
tional model of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966), would not be tolerated.
444 U.S. at 322.
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II. Due Process Standards and Jurisdictional Limits
This section argues that jurisdictional due process issues and choice
of law issues must be put in the context of general due process methodol-
ogy and standards to understand and properly implement the changes
implicit in International Shoe and in the due process approach of the
1930s and 1940s. The theory and methodology of due process as a limi-
tation on choice of law decisions by state courts changed with the due
process revolution of the 1930s and 1940s. Essentially a rational or rea-
sonable basis standard was adopted since the type of individual interests
affected by state courts' choice of law actions were typically nonfunda-
mental interests171 -property and economic rights-under the Court's
dichotomous characterization of interests as either nonfundamental or
fundamental. Under the rational basis standard, the Court defers to the
state policy choice in the choice of law decision, and only interferes
where there is no legitimate state interest or need served by the state law
applied.'72 The rational basis standard places an almost insurmountable
burden on the party claiming a due process violation by requiring the
claimant to plead and prove that the state action is completely arbi-
trary-lacking any connection to a legitimate state interest. In such
cases, the critical point is the characterization of the claimant's interest
as fundamental or nonfundamental. If the claimant cannot convince the
Court that the interest he or she is asserting is fundamental, the claimant
will lose, since the burden cast under due process standards will be too
hard to meet.
On the other hand, if the claimant can successfully plead and prove
that the individual interest asserted is fundamental and is seriously im-
paired by the state's policy, the burden shifts to the state to prove either a
compelling social need to interfere or a compelling state interest. 173 Once
the burden shifts to the state to justify its interference with the funda-
171. The types of interest affected by extraterritorial jurisdiction typically have been eco-
nomic interests. The defendant usually is complaining that exercise of jurisdictional power is
going to cost him money. The money may be in the form of costs of defense, damages, taxes,
etc. The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdictional power is essentially a regulatory action sub-
jecting economic interests to reasonable regulation.
172. The reference here is to the position the Court has taken in regard to economic inter-
ests since the 1930s. The Court has applied a rational basis standard to claims of infringement
of economic interests under the Due Process Clause. The claimant can be victorious only if he
can convince the Court that there is no reasonable basis for the state regulatory action. This is
essentially the same as proving that the state has no legitimate need or interest to be served by
the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
173. A compelling interest is one which will justify an interference with a fundamental
interest of an individual. It is incumbent on the state to empirically demonstrate that such an
infringement is necessary to protect a vital state interest.
mental interest, the claimant is likely to prevail since the burden is very
onerous, comparable in difficulty to the burden of the claimant whose
asserted interest is judged to be nonfundamental. Under this due process
framework, the critical factor in the disposition of the constitutional issue
is the characterization of the plaintiff's interest. What attorneys and
their clients must do is find ways to convince the Court that the claim-
ant's interest should be seen as fundamental. Sometimes with ingenuity
and the invocation of important social values, the claimant's interest that
on the surface looks like a nonfundamental interest can be successfully
characterized as fundamental. 174
A classic example of this characterization game can be seen in Sher-
bert v. Verner,171 in which a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unem-
ployment compensation because she refused to take employment that
would require her to work on Saturday, which she said was against her
religion. The state took the position that unemployment compensation
interests are nonfundamental in nature and subject to state regulation.
The claimant, of course, argued that her interest was a fundamental in-
terest protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court accepted the claimant's characterization and struck down the
state action denying her unemployment compensation. Here the state
could not prove a compelling interest in denying her the benefits. 176 The
Court, in dealing with the characterization issue, indicated that the eco-
nomic effects of the denial of benefits by the state action were merely the
means by which her religious interests were infringed. 17 7 Just two years
before Sherbert v. Verner, the Court in Braunfeld v. Brown178 rejected a
claim by Orthodox Jews that Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law im-
paired their religious beliefs by bringing economic pressure on them to be
open on Saturday since they could not be open on Sunday under the law.
In Braunfeld, the Court refused to adopt the claimants' characterization
of their interest as fundamental under the First Amendment and chose
174. Despite Justice Powell's statement in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 32 (1973), to the effect that, in determining whether an interest is fundamental, the
critical factor is whether it is explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution not it's social value.
See also Bopp & Coleson, Webster and the Future of Substantive Due Process, 28 DuQ. L. REv.
271, 279-80 (1990) (discussing a change in the Supreme Court's analysis of substantive due
process towards a less result-oriented and more objective analysis).
175. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
176. Id. at 409.
177. Id. at 404.
178. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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instead to view their interest as a nonfundamental economic interest.'79
This characterization essentially defeated the claimants' constitutional
argument by placing the onerous burden of showing a lack of a rational
basis for the statute on the claimants.
Another case that demonstrates the operation of the characteriza-
tion game is Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,I8I in which the state
of Arizona denied welfare benefits to persons who had lived in Arizona
less than a year. The state, in accord with earlier constitutional doctrine,
argued that welfare rights were not fundamental in the context of due
process standards. The Court evaded this characterization by pointing
out that it was the fundamental right to travel that was being infringed
by the state policy.'' The state then was not able to meet the heavy
burden of proving a compelling state interest that would justify the
infringement.
A similar characterization game has been played by the Court in
order to protect economic non-fundamental rights in the new property
cases"' in which the Court characterized the interests asserted by the
claimants as procedural due process interests, thereby allowing the Court
to protect economic interests in a way denied to it by the substantive due
process standards."8 3 Under procedural due process requirements for
fairness the Court has much greater freedom to substitute its judgment
for that of the state legislature or court. This intentional separation of
procedural due process and substantive due process is a familiar device to
allow the Court to do under the rubric of procedural due process what it
has said it cannot do under substantive due process.
Accordingly, the Court always classifies jurisdictional issues under
procedural due process in order to limit state courts' power of choice of
law. The role of jurisdictional limitation is to allow the Court the power
to deny certain state court choices of law where in the judgment of the
179. Id. The claimant's interest was reduced to a nonfundamental economic interest by
choice of the Court. The state statute was seen as merely a regulation of economic interests
despite its special effects on Orthodox Jews.
180. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
181. Id. at 269. There is an endless array of cases showing how the characterization game
is played under the due process standards. A list of such cases would include those involving
economic zoning, welfare benefits, state funding of public education, right of privacy, etc.
182. The new property cases were cases decided in the 1960s and early 1970s in which
property and economic rights-nonfundamental rights-were protected by the Court in ways
that seemed inconsistent with earlier cases. The Court gave heightened scrutiny to these inter-
ests by dealing with them under procedural due process. See supra notes 135-51, and accom-
panying text.
183. Ordinarily the standard to apply for economic rights was a rational basis standard
which, in effect, allowed states to regulate these nonfundamental rights in almost any fashion.
The Court typically deferred to state actions.
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Court those choices might either upset the defendant's legitimate territo-
rial expectations of what law is to be applied or result in the application
of anachronistic law. From this social-functional perspective, procedural
and substantive due process merge and the interrelationship of choice of
law and jurisdiction issues becomes obvious. Moreover, the policy-ori-
ented nature of jurisdictional due process methodology becomes
apparent.
The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that the due process
methodology established by the radical changes of the 1930s and 1940s is
essentially an interest analysis and an accommodation approach under
which the Court has developed social-functional standards" and that
these same due process standards should be applied to both choice of law
and jurisdiction issues. Under this social-functional perspective, the
Court has the obligation of elucidating the nature and social significance
of the constitutional interest asserted by ncrnresident defendants in juris-
dictional issues. Is the interest a fundamental interest or a nonfunda-
mental interest? What criteria should be applied? Is the standard to be a
rational basis, under which the Court would almost always defer to the
jurisdictional choice of the state? Or is the interest asserted by the de-
fendant a fundamental one, which would require the state to show a
compelling interest or need? The Court has consistently failed to satis-
factorily elucidate the nature of the defendant's interest and its social
value. The Court has indicated that the defendant's interest is not
strictly economic. Yet the Court has not stated that it is fundamental. 185
It has not spoken of a compelling interest or its equivalent.
The Court has avoided elucidating the nature of the defendant's in-
terest by making the question of contacts the central, threshold inquiry
and denying that any consideration of the forum state's interest or sub-
stantive policy is relevant to analyzing minimum contacts. The Court
has further confounded social-functional methodology by its objective,
nonqualitative notion of contacts. However, it is in consideration of the
contacts questions that the Court, in a self-contradictory and unavowed
manner, implicitly engages in a balancing of interests. The outcome of
the interest balancing process is announced in the ostensibly objective
(factual) conclusion of whether the requisite minimum contacts exist.
184. By social-functional standards I mean that the rational basis and compelling interest
standards involve the Court in an interest analysis and interest balancing approach.
185. The Court has not explained why the defendant's interest is one that justifies the
Court's invalidation of the forum state's need or interest. What is it about the defendant's
interest that calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of a type reserved for fundamental interests?
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In virtually all the cases where the Burger-Rehnquist Court has in-
validated jurisdictional actions by state courts, the Court has said that
there were no contacts or insufficient contacts. Only in Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co. v. Superior Court, has the Court arguably gone beyond the
contacts question to deal with the qualitative notion of fairness.186 The
significance of Asahi in this regard is somewhat ambiguous, because the
discussion of the qualitative factors under the fairness branch of the In-
ternational Shoe standards seems to be dicta since the majority had al-
ready stated that there were not minimum contacts in this case.187 The
majority seems to be taking the position that even if the facts were to be
construed as satisfying the minimum contacts test, the assertion of juris-
diction over Asahi would be unfair. The Court suggests that California
has no legitimate interest in providing a forum for a dispute over indem-
nification that is between two companies from foreign countries."88 The
majority also suggest that when the defendant is a nonresident alien, fed-
eral interests in foreign affairs may militate against jurisdiction, particu-
larly when in this case the forum's interest is slight or nonexistent.18 9
This discussion does not mean that the Court has switched from a con-
tacts-dominated approach to an interest-analysis approach, since this dis-
cussion is essentially a way of buttressing the courts no contacts
conclusion. However, from a social-functional approach, the factors dis-
cussed by the Court in dicta are some evidence of what the Court really
thinks about when it considers whether or not there are contacts and
whether the contacts are substantial enough to meet the minimum con-
tacts requirement. These qualitative factors such as interest of the fo-
rum, interests of the plaintiff, substantive policy concerns, interests of
other states, and federal interests, are surreptitiously considered by the
conservative Justices when they decide whether the required contacts are
present. Thus, on an operational level but not on a formal level of dis-
course and doctrine, the Court acts in a fashion consistent with the so-
cial-functional policy-judging role of the judiciary. It is an example of
the familiar discrepancy between what the Court says it is doing and
what it is actually doing as pointed out by both the realist and the critical
186. 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987).
187. Id. at 112. In Asahi, the majority discusses qualitative factors only to support its
quantitative conclusion that there are not enough contacts.
188. Id at 114.
189. The Court in Asahi also indicated that the forum had little or no interest in providing
a forum for a dispute between two foreign nationals. Id. Its discussion of the forum's interest
in the context of the due process jurisdictional issue could be construed as involving the Court
in a switch to a qualitative, social-functional approach by a reader hoping for such a change.
legal studies scholars.19"
Under the social-functional standards, most interests would proba-
bly be characterized as nonfundamental economic interests, 191 meaning
that state courts' jurisdictional assertions would be valid so long as they
were made to effectuate legitimate state interests. If some of the interests
affected by state courts' extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction were
characterized as fundamental, then the stricter standard of scrutiny,
compelling interest, would allow the court to invalidate such jurisdic-
tional actions when the states' interests were not compelling. Under this
approach, the Court would be forced to enunciate and evaluate the indi-
vidual and state interests involved in the jurisdictional issues under the
Due Process Clause. Only in exceptional cases, when fundamental indi-
vidual interests were infringed, would the Due Process Clause be used to
invalidate state court jurisdictional actions.
The Burger-Rehnquist Court seems to assume that since we have
traditionally followed a defendant-oriented bias in jurisdictional theory,
then the defendant's interest has become a vested fundamental right and
any change in treatment of that interest is subject to strict scrutiny. 192
This is the discredited conservative vested-rights notion' 93 surfacing
again in jurisdictional disguise. Under a modem social-functional ap-
proach to limits on state exercises of power, including jurisdictional
power, the limits are in two forms. The first is in the familiar form of
individual rights guaranteed by various provisions of the federal Consti-
tution. The second basic limit is that imposed on the state by federal
interests expressly or implicitly written into the federal Constitution.
The most familiar federal interest limit is that imposed on state actions
by the Commerce Clause. Thus, if the Court finds that state action inter-
feres with the free flow of commerce among the states, it will invalidate
190. Both legal realists and critical studies scholars are fond of pointing out the discrep-
ancy between formalist rules and their actual effects on people. The realists might use the term
law-in-action to contrast with the formal rules of textbook and statute. Critical legal studies
scholars are quick to point out that formal legal rules which are ostensibly for the goal of the
community typically are, in actual effect, protection of powerful interests at the expense of the
less privileged of the community.
191. In most cases the interests affected by the extra-territorial jurisdictional exercise are
pecuniary in nature. See supra note 181.
192. The Court makes no attempt to explain the value and social significance of the defend-
ant bias in traditional territorial jurisdiction theory. Why is it more fair or proper for the
plaintiff to go to the defendant's home state to bring suit than for the defendant to defend in
the plaintiff's home state? Is there any way to deal with this matter without getting into sub-
stantive value concerns? Can jurisdiction be substantively neutral?
193. Here, I refer to the attempts under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause to
protect property and economic interest from regulation by the state in the 19th century and
the early 20th century.
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the state action unless, as in very rare cases, the Court concludes that
there is a very strong state interest to interfere. The same type of meth-
odology would be applied where state jurisdictional assertions threaten
other federal interests. 194  This social-functional approach under the
modem Commerce Clause involves the Court in elucidating, evaluating,
and balancing state and federal interests in much the same fashion the
Court operates under due process standards. The burden is on the party
claiming a Commerce Clause violation to plead and prove that the inter-
est asserted for protection is within the ambit of Commerce Clause pro-
tection and that this interest is substantially impaired by the state
action. 195 If the Court accepts this characterization and proof of impair-
ment, the burden shifts to the state to justify the impairment by a very
compelling state interest or need. Ordinarily the state cannot prove such
a need or interest and its action will be struck down. In social-functional
form, the Commerce Clause standards are like the due process standards
for fundamental rights in terms of allocation of proof burdens and of the
importance of the characterization of the interests asserted. Under both
sets of standards, interest analysis and policy judging methodologies were
worked out in the 1930s and 1940s under the influence of realist legal
theory. Thus, in terms of the social-functional constitutional standards,
the argument is that state extraterritorial assertions are limited by either
individual fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause or by fed-
eral interests that may be found explicitly or implicitly in the various
provisions of the federal Constitution of which the Commerce Clause is
the prototype.
Under this social-functional approach to constitutional limitations
on state powers, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause pro-
tect different interests and involve the use of separate standards. Under
194. The Commerce Clause is the chief and most important example of federal interests as
limits on state actions. The limits however, are not definitional or formalistic. Instead, the
limits are pragmatic and functional and vary with time and circumstance. While other federal
powers as limits on state action have not been as systematically elucidated as the commerce
power, the same type of pragmatic, functional standards can be developed with regard to other
federal powers. The federal power over foreign relations is one such power that can and has
been used to limit state regulatory power. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). The foreign affairs power has obvious implications in
cases such as Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) and
Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), in which the defendants are
foreign nationals operating outside the United States.
195. The claimant demonstrates that his actions are in fact specific instances of the free
movement of goods, services, or people among the states. The claimant's burden is not merely
that he suffers because of the state regulation. His burden is to show how harm to him is harm
to the protected federal interests which are in fact for the protection of all the citizens of the
United States.
due process the claims raised are of individual interests that are classified
as either fundamental or nonfundamental, and the state interest or need
is measured against the individual interests under the appropriate stan-
dard, compelling interest or rational basis. Under the Commerce Clause,
the claimant must show how the state action either interferes with the
free flow of goods, services, or people among the states or how the state
action discriminates against commerce among the states. 19 6 The interests
protected by the Commerce Clause are federal interests, national inter-
ests, or interests of all the people of the United States, whereas due pro-
cess claims are individual and particular. In the context of jurisdictional
issues, under due process the interests most commonly affected by state
action are economic or property interests, which would typically be sub-
ject to state regulation including jurisdictional regulation. Only in unu-
sual cases would the defendant be able to demonstrate that the economic
harm also involved harm to federal interests of the type protected by the
Commerce Clause.
Due process claims should be treated separately from claims based
on interference with important federal interests, though both claims may
be brought by the same person as alternate causes of action in the same
case. A state extraterritorial assertion might be valid as against a due
process challenge but run afoul of the Commerce Clause or some other
provision protecting federal interests. The two different claims would
involve different issues, proofs, and justifications. This type of alternate
claim or cause of action technique was quite common during the 1940s
and 1950s where state regulatory actions were often challenged under the
Due Process and Commerce Clause.
19 7
If we look at Asahi'98 and Helicopteros,99 in which the defendants
196. See, eg., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1958), in which the Court indi-
cated that there was a presumption of the validity of the state safety regulition. By use of the
notion of presumptive validity the court implicitly places the burden of rebutting the presump-
tion of validity on the party claiming that the state regulation is inconsistent with the com-
merce clause. This usually means that the claimant must introduce factual evidence that
demonstrates how the state regulation interferes with interstate commerce or how the state
regulation discriminates against interstate commerce. In Bibb, the Freight Lines showed how
having to change mudflaps at states lines interfered with the free and effective flow of interstate
commerce. In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Dean Milk Company of
Illinois rebutted the presumption of validity of the Madison, Wisconsin health ordinance by
showing how it discriminated against the introduction of Illinois milk into Madison. The
Dean Milk Company met its burden of demonstrating how the state regulation discriminated
against the interstate commerce in milk.
197. See Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1941); Norton Co. v. Dept. of Reve-
nue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Braniff Airways Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S.
590 (1954); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959);.
198. 480 U.S. 102.
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were from foreign countries, there was an obvious possibility that federal
interests might be affected adversely if the California and Texas courts
took jurisdiction and applied forum law in these situations. In
Helicopteros, jurisdiction in Texas would contravene the contractual pro-
vision for jurisdiction in Peruvian courts and the legitimate expectations
of the defendant as to what substantive law would be applied. It also
might be embarrassing for our country in its relationships to the South
American countries involved. In Asahi, jurisdiction and application of
California substantive law likewise might have serious repercussions on
our relations with Japan and Taiwan. In both cases, the defendant might
have a basis for a claim of interference with the foreign affairs power that
is protected by the federal power over foreign affairs and also by the
Foreign Commerce Clause. Such a claim by the defendant would require
the defendant to adduce facts that would indicate in pragmatic fashion
the actual effects of the state's assertion of jurisdiction on the federal
interests. Such a claim under social-functional standards always involves
a pragmatic social-factual inquiry into the tangible effects on federal in-
terests by the parties and by the Court.
In these cases, however, the interests came up under a due process
framework instead of under the Commerce Clause standards or those
under the foreign affairs power. It would seem more appropriate and
straightforward for the Court to recognize this as a separate type of con-
stitutional limitation on state court jurisdiction. Moreover, because of
the strong and almost exclusive power of the federal government in these
areas, such a recognition would provide a stronger vehicle for limitation
of the state court's jurisdiction in such cases. Likewise, the Court should
develop the limits on jurisdiction under the Domestic Commerce Clause
in the more frequent domestic jurisdictional situations. There has been
an occasional case where the Court has successfully invoked the Domes-
tic Commerce Clause and the federal interests under it as a limit on state
court jurisdiction.' °° However, the Court, and the Burger-Rehnquist
Court in particular, has not been eager to use the Commerce Clause in-
terests or other federal interests to invalidate state court jurisdiction.
Similarly, the Burger-Rehnquist Court seems to have taken the posi-
199. 466 U.S. 408.
200. See R. WENTRAUB, supra note 51, at 201-03; Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932);
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th. Cir. 1956); White v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 386 S.W.2d (Mo. 1965).
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tion that fundamental rights are not a limit on state court jurisdiction." 1
This position in part stems from the Court's desire to keep jurisdictional
issues within the procedural due process category since this gives it more
leeway in dealing with jurisdiction issues. In Calder v. Jones, an inter-
state defamation case, the Burger-Rehnquist Court said that the First
Amendment is not a relevant factor in jurisdictional issues.20 2 The Court
seemed to try to put to rest the claim asserted in earlier cases that the
First Amendment, particularly where the defendant is a newspaper or
magazine, is a source of limitation on the state jurisdictional power.20 3
The implication of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's position seems to be
that there is no room for fundamental rights due process standards in
jurisdictional questions. Such a position follows logically from the
Court's characterization of jurisdictional issues as exclusively falling
within procedural due process with its own distinct standards. It is also
consistent with the Court's reluctance to expand fundamental rights cate-
gories." The Court is simply unwilling to engage in the kind of social-
functional constitutional analysis involved in the due process standards
and in the federal interest standards. Candidly, the Burger-Rehnquist
Court is fearful of losing the control of its formalist due process charac-
terization, and of the implications of the social-functional approach for
the Court's desired return to a conservative federalism perspective, simi-
lar to that in vogue before the constitutional revolution of the 1930s and
1940s. Under the social-functional approach, the Burger-Rehnquist
Court would have to explain why the traditional defendant bias under
the territorial jurisdiction conception is one that is important enough to
override legitimate state needs and interests, federal interests, and mod-
em plaintiff-oriented substantive policies.
201. Despite lower court decisions which have suggested that First Amendment rights may
limit extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Burger-Rehnquist Court has not been willing to allow
fundamental rights jurisprudence into jurisdictional issues under procedural due process.
202. 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
203. See New York Times v. Connors, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New York
Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
204. The Burger-Rehnquist Court has refused to expand fundamental rights categories and
attempted to move from a compelling interest standard toward an "intermediate standard,"
which gives the impression that the Court is not making policy decisions or balancing interest.
The intermediate standard has the tendency to mask the policymaking activity of the Court.
The intermediate standard asks whether the state regulation has a reasonable relation to an
important governmental interest. This gives the appearance that what is involved is an exer-
cise in logic and not policy and interest judging.
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IV. Jurisdiction as a Choice of Law Limitation
This section argues that the Burger-Rehnquist Court, in a functional
sense, has used the due process jurisdictional limits as a means of invali-
dating state court choice's of law that upset what the Court views as the
legitimate territorial expectations of the defendant or involve the applica-
tion of anachronistic substantive law. Stated in another way, the Burger-
Rehnquist Court uses jurisdictional due process as a way to do what the
Court has adjudged it cannot do under choice of law due process stan-
dards. The Court has taken a rational basis approach to due process
issues involving state court choice of law decisions. Under this approach,
the Court has essentially deferred to the forum choice of law as long as
the forum has a legitimate interest or need to be effectuated by the policy
chosen.2 °5 Having taken this approach in many cases since the 1930s
and 1940s,2"6 it is particularly difficult for the formalist Burger-Rehn-
quist Court to change this mode of institutional behavior. The conserva-
tive formalist members of the Burger-Rehnquist Court, however, are not
happy with the way this social-functional standard works out, because it
allows the state courts a good deal of discretion that is often used to
defeat what the conservative formalists see as vested rights and to inter-
fere with what these Justices consider to be the interests of other
states.2 °7 In a more comprehensive sense, the conservative formalist Jus-
205. The Court's rational basis approach to state exercises of regulatory power over
nonfundamental interests includes questions of state courts' choice of law actions. In Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), the Court upheld a Minnesota court's application of
Minnesota law to an auto insurance contract between Allstate and an insured who lived in
Wisconsin. Moreover, the accident occurred in Wisconsin and the insured died in Wisconsin.
The action was brought by the decedent insured's widow, who moved to Minnesota after the
death of her husband. The Court deferred to the Minnesota court's choice to apply Minnesota
law to this case. Under Minnesota law, the allowable recovery was much higher that under
Wisconsin law. The Minnesota Court had a rational basis for regulating the contract
(nonfundamental) rights involved. Id. at 312-20.
206. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981). In these cases the Court allowed the state courts to apply their law since there
were legitimate contacts of the non-resident defendants with the forum states. The Court
speaks of contacts and not forum interests or needs in these cases. However, it is clear in these
cases that the Court does not invalidate the forum's choice of law if the forum has a legitimate
interest or need to be implemented. This is essentially a rational basis approach couched in
contacts terminology.
207. In terms of the vested rights perspective, Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), might
serve as a good example. Because an accident occurred in Indiana and the parties resided in
Indiana, Indiana law should govern the cause of action against the defendant. Under Indiana's
guest statute, the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff passenger since the defendant was
guilty of mere negligence. Id. at 322. Thus, the rights were vested in Indiana at the time of the
accident and should not be subject to change in another jurisdiction, that is, Minnesota. Like-
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tices object to the social-functional approach to constitutional issues in
general. This general aversion to social-functional methods has mani-
fested itself in the Burger-Rehnquist Court's retreat from the compelling
interest/fundamental right standard to an intermediate standard wher-
ever possible.2"8 Given this type of ideological outlook, what can be done
to change the Court's position on due process choice of law issues short
of wholesale overruling of the earlier cases? Obviously there are strong
social factors that militate against this route. Moreover, this kind of
change tends to be incompatible with formalist ideology, which idolizes
stability and certainty. The alternative is to construct a category differ-
ent from the one needing change; under this rubric, the Court then can
do what it desires without the appearance of change. This is the sort of
legal fiction that appeals to formalist minds, and the one chosen by the
Burger-Rehnquist Court. Jurisdiction inextricably intertwined with
choice of law is treated as a separate category coming under procedural
due process.Y°9 With this characterization, the Court is free to operate
differently and to strike down state court attempts to apply state policy in
an extraterritorial fashion. Procedural due process allows the Court to
control the interest analysis and accommodation process in an ad hoc
manner free of substantive due process methodology. This procedural
categorization of jurisdiction not only allows the subtle reinstatement of
a formalist rhetoric but also provides a method to forestall certain choice
of law decisions by state courts.
210
The story begins in 1958 with the case of Hanson v. Denckla,211 in
which the Warren Court invalidated a Florida state court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee in a probate case where all the bene-
ficiaries of the trust and takers under the will were present in Florida.
The residuary legatees argued that the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment in Florida by the settlor of the trust was invalid because it did not
wise, Minnesota's application of its law providing for liability on the part of the Indiana de-
fendant is seen as a significant interference with the sovereignty of Indiana. However, from a
social-functional perspective, there is little actual effect on Indiana or its policy.
208. See also Bopp and Coleson, supra note 174, in which the authors express alarm over
the Court's rejection of a social-functional approach and the Court's attempt to return to a
formalist approach to due process.
209. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 258, in which Justice Black acknowledges the
intimate relationship between choice of law (i.e., substantive due process) and jurisdiction,
(i.e., procedural due process) but insists that they are different for due process purposes.
210. For example, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984), the decision that Texas courts do not have jurisdiction over the Colombian defendant
prevents the Texas courts from applying Texas tort law which undoubtedly would subject the
defendant to much greater liability than the law of Colombia or Peru. Id. at 413-19. The real
problem is not jurisdiction but choices of law.
211. 357 U.S. 235 (1957).
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conform to certain formalities required by Florida law. The trust had
been set up in Delaware by the settlor-testator, who at that time was
domiciled in Pennsylvania and who later moved to Florida where she
died after living there for several years. Apparently, the settlor had cho-
sen to set up the trust in Delaware because the laws of Delaware were
more liberal than those of Pennsylvania. The court invalidated Florida's
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the trustee, which in effect
validated the trust arrangement and accomplished the settlor-testator's
wishes. The decision in Hanson allowed for an equitable sharing of the
settlor-testator's assets among her heirs. She had worked out a fair
method for distribution of her property, and the Court rightly enforced
her intentions.
Though the Court in Hanson ostensibly based its decision on lack of
contacts of the trustee with Florida under the rubric of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,212 a social-fumctional analysis of the Court's de-
cision reveals it as really a choice of law decision that sought to validate
the settlor's intention. The decision, in effect, invalidated Florida's appli-
cation of its law, which was anachronistic and out of line with the
Court's preferred choice of law approach, which was to validate trust
arrangements if they were valid in the state of administration.213 The
basic substantive policy approach in trust law and in conflicts of law was
thus upheld.
In Hanson, the Court enunciated the position it has consistently
maintained, that jurisdiction and choice of law are separate categories
under due process.214 The Court explained that even though the forum
state, Florida, might very well satisfy due process in terms of choice of
law-that is, choose to apply its own law because of its legitimate interest
in the probate of the will of a Florida domiciliary-the jurisdictional due
process question was to be measured by different standards that in effect
were more stringent.21 5 It was also in this case that the Court adum-
brated its now infamous purposeful availment doctrine to decide what
contacts count under the International Shoe standard. The Court found
that the trustee had not purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
protections of the state of Florida. The Court reached this conclusion
despite the fact that the trustee had been in continuous communication
with the settlor about the trust since the settlor moved to Florida. These
212. 376 U.S. 310 (1945).
213. The trend in the choice of law approach to trust arrangements is to validate the trust
arrangements if they were valid (1) at the place where they were made or (2) at the situs of the
res. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 130, at §§ 189, 190.
214. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
215. Id.
contacts did not count, however, under International Shoe. Apparently,
what would have been necessary were attempts to solicit business in Flor-
ida or transactions in Florida, both of which carry heavy territorial con-
notations from the pre-International Shoe era.216
The Court had a difficult dilemma. If it followed the interest analy-
sis of its choice of law due process standards, it would have to validate
the Florida decision, which would be unjust under these facts and upset
the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the settlor-testator. This
would also be a blow to the progressive substantive policy of trusts,
which would allow such an arrangement, and the basic thrust of conflict
of law in this area. On the other hand, if the Court denied Florida juris-
diction over the trustee, it would frustrate Florida's legitimate interest
and cramp on the social-functional approach to jurisdiction adopted in
International Shoe and Mullane, which it had implemented in the previ-
ous term in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co..217 In Hanson, the
Court chose the preferred substantive policy of validating the settlor's
intention and the trust arrangement by denying jurisdiction, which in a
very real sense made bad jurisdictional policy and laid the groundwork
for a formalist methodology by which the International Shoe approach
would eventually be subverted by the territorial concept.21
There was an obvious tension between the Court's decision in Mc-
Gee, which seemed to be effectuating the social-functional vision of Inter-
national Shoe,2 19 and its decision in Hanson, which seemed to give
impetus to the formalist territorial perspective.2 ' From a social-func-
tional perspective, a later court might have read Hanson as a somewhat
anomalous decision based on the equities of the situation, and thereby
refused to expand on the territorial implications of the purposeful avail-
ment formulation. A later court, however, with formalist territorial bias,
216. Id. at 253-54.
217. It seems clear in Hanson that the Court was influenced by pre-International Shoe ideas
of soliciting business or doing business which emphasizes actions done by the defendant in the
forum rather than a social-functional standard which would center on the forum state's legiti-
mate interest or need to have jurisdiction to effectuate its policies (i.e., administering the estate
among Florida residents).
218. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Court upheld California's assertion of jurisdiction over the
defendant insurance company which had its offices in Texas. The defendant apparently had
one insurance contract on a California insured which was the one involved in this case. This
single "contact" was sufficient to give California jurisdiction in an action by a California bene-
ficiary. The case seems somewhat suspect viewed from a territorial perspective. However,
from a social-functional perspective the case is not exceptional. California had a legitimate
interest in providing a forum for the California beneficiary where the decedent was also a
California resident. See infra Part V where McGee is discussed.
219. See supra Part II.
220. 326 U.S. 310.
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might choose to expand the purposeful availment formulation into an
important conceptual tool for infusing a formalist territorial perspective
into jurisdictional questions.221
The next important United States Supreme Court case denying a
state court's assertion of jurisdiction and also exemplifying how the
Court uses jurisdictional questions to supervise state court applications of
substantive law in cases involving nonresident defendants, Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court,22 was decided almost 20 years after Hanson. In Kulko, the
defendant was the former husband of the plaintiff. The parties had sepa-
rated in New York, the marriage domicile. The plaintiff moved to San
Francisco, and shortly thereafter a separation agreement was executed in
New York. The agreement gave custody of the two children to the father
during the school year and provided that the two children would spend
Christmas, Easter, and summer vacations with their mother. The de-
fendant agreed to pay three thousand dollars per year in child support
for the period when the children would be in the plaintiff's care and cus-
tody. The plaintiff then procured an ex parte divorce in Haiti. In De-
cember 1973, when the daughter told her father she wanted to live with
her mother in San Francisco, the defendant allowed her to do so. Three
years later, the son decided he wanted to live in San Francisco with his
mother and, without the father's knowledge, the son called his mother.
She sent an airline ticket to him, and he went to San Francisco to live.
One month later, the plaintiff began an action in California to gain cus-
tody of the children and to increase the support allowance. The defend-
ant, who was served in New York, entered a special appearance
challenging California's personal jurisdiction claim over him because of
lack of minimum contacts under the International Shoe standard. A Cal-
ifornia trial court held it had jurisdiction over the defendant.223 The de-
fendant did not further challenge the custody jurisdiction finding but did
appeal the determination of jurisdiction for support purposes. The de-
fendant, after losing in the California Supreme Court,224 petitioned the
United States Supreme Court on the support jurisdiction issue.
The United States Supreme Court held that there were no contacts
with California under the purposeful availment doctrine enunciated in
Hanson.225 The majority concluded that the defendant had not purpose-
fully availed himself of the benefits and protections of California law.226
221. See supra Part II.
222. Id.
223. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
224. Kulko v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1976).
225. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
226. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978).
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There is little doubt that the Court could have found minimum contacts
in this situation since the defendant allowed the daughter to go to Cali-
fornia and live there and he did not contest the California trial court's
determination of jurisdiction for the custody aspect of the case. In real-
ity, the defendant acquiesced to custody by the mother, therefore there
would be an inevitable, legitimate need to increase the child support since
the children would be living full-time in California. Moreover, under a
social-functional interest analysis, California would have an interest in
applying its law and policy to the support issues. The Court may have
been concerned that a finding of minimum contacts and jurisdiction
might have dire substantive policy effects where there were serious
problems with enticing or kidnapping children and bringing them to an-
other state ready to exercise jurisdiction over custody and support mat-
ters.227 It seems clear that such considerations of social policy were
critical in this case and though the Court clothed its opinion in the for-
malist rhetoric of contacts its decision was grounded in substantive, so-
cial policy concerns.228 The Court used jurisdiction to prevent California
from applying its law to the support issue and upsetting basic policy con-
cerns in family law. Also it seems clear that there were strong territorial
overtones in the case, as the Court continues its program of protecting
nonresidents from property settlements and support orders in family
matters where the nonresident defendant does not personally appear.
229
Chronologically, the next important case denying state court extra-
territorial jurisdiction was the celebrated case of World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.23° In this case, the plaintiffs, who had lived in New
York when they purchased a new Audi from a New York retailer, Sea-
way Volkswagen, were moving to Arizona when their car was struck
from the rear by another car in the state of Oklahoma. A fire resulted
from the impact, and the wife and two children were severely burned.
The plaintiffs filed suit in Oklahoma under the Oklahoma long-arm stat-
ute, against the manufacturer, the importer, the regional United States
distributor, and the retail dealer. The manufacturer and the importer
227. Id. at 101.
228. See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 51, at §§ 5.3C and 5.3D (discussing child
snatching and forum shopping and the Uniform Custody and Jurisdiction Act). See also UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY AND JURISDICTION ACT Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1968); Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
229. Arguably, the real grounds for denying California jurisdiction were social policy con-
cerns. There was nothing unfair or unreasonable about California exercising jurisdiction or
applying its law in this case. In fact, Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990), is
functionally indistinguishable from Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). There
should be jurisdiction in both cases.
230. See WEIrRAUB, supra note 51, at 248-52.
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consented to personal jurisdiction in the action in the Oklahoma courts,
but the regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, and the retailer,
Seaway Volkswagen, contested the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Oklahoma court under the minimum contacts/fair-play doctrine.
231
The Court struck down Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over the re-
gional distributor and the retailer, citing the purposeful availment doc-
trine enunciated in Hanson v. Denckla232 and amplified in Kulko.233 The
defendants had not done anything to purposefully avail themselves of the
protections and benefits of Oklahoma law. The defendants neither car-
ried on nor solicited business in Oklahoma, but both were links in an
interstate distribution system. The Court's decision also contained ex-
plicit statements enhancing the formalist territorial notion of state lines
as barriers to jurisdiction.234 Under the facts, it seems clear that defend-
ing the suit in Oklahoma would not impose much of a financial burden
on the defendant companies and that Oklahoma would be as convenient
a forum as could be found. The underlying reasons for this denial of
jurisdiction from a social-functional viewpoint are found in an antagonis-
tic attitude toward the plaintiff-oriented revolution in tort law23' and ju-
risdictional issues. In addition, progressive tort law tends to assign
liability to the manufacturer for such defects.236 In this case, the manu-
facturer and U.S. importer of Audi were before the Court, and there was
no functional reason for including the innocent retailer and distributor in
the action. Substantive tort policy points toward the liability of the man-
ufacturer when it is available and solvent.2 37 Here again, the Court's
231. 444 U.S. 286 (1990).
232. Id. at 289.
233. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
234. 436 U.S. 84.
235. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293-94, stated explicitly:
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant
for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. The economic interdependence
of the States was foreseen and desired by the Framers .... But the Framers also
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.
The Court openly demonstrates its commitment to outdated notions of federalism and state
powers.
236. As indicated supra Part I, the change toward a plaintiff oriented tort law was also
reflected in a plaintiff-orientation in choice of law and jurisdiction in tort cases. The plaintiff's
choice of the Oklahoma forum is consistent with the plaintiff-orientation in tort policy and
jurisdiction policy. The Burger-Rehnquist Court rejects this social-functional view ofjurisdic-
tion in favor of a territorial view. In a sense, the Court denies the social reality of the change
in tort policy and its impact on jurisdictional practice and theory.
237. It also appears obvious that the denial of jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen was
based in part on changes in tort law which now tends to put liability on the manufacturer of
defective products rather than on the retailer. The manufacturer can more readily spread the
rVol. 18:819
decision was rendered in the formalist territorial rhetoric of minimum
contacts but based on social fact and substantive policy. Jurisdiction was
used to prevent state court application of state law, which in this particu-
lar context was unnecessary and an embodiment of the social-functional
revolution in tort law that makes jurisdiction plaintiff-oriented.
This brings us to the next significant case involving denial of state
court jurisdiction in the Burger-Rehnquist era: Rush v. Savchuk.238 Rush
was decided about the same time as World-Wide Volkswagen. In Rush,
the plaintiff was a passenger in the car driven by the defendant and
owned by the defendant's father. The plaintiff was injured in a single car
crash. Both plaintiff and defendant were Indiana residents at the time of
the accident. Indiana had a guest statute that would have barred recov-
ery by the plaintiff.239 About a year and a half later the plaintiff and his
parents moved to Minnesota. One year after that, the plaintiff com-
menced an action in the Minnesota state courts. The suit was filed more
than two years after the accident and after the Indiana two year statute
of limitations had run.2 ' The action was brought as a quasi in rem ac-
tion in which the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that defendant's
right to indemnification and to a defense paid for by State Farm were
grounds for jurisdiction in the Minnesota courts.241 After the action was
filed, the plaintiff moved to have State Farm added as a party to the
action since State Farm as a garnishee had denied any liability to the
defendant. State Farm had offices in Minnesota and did extensive busi-
ness in Minnesota. The Minnesota courts upheld jurisdiction. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court stated that even though the defendant had no
contacts with Minnesota, fairness considerations allowed jurisdiction
since the insurer controls the defense and does business in Minnesota,
costs and the defects are normally caused during the manufacturing process. Here, the manu-
facturer and United States importer were already before the Court and were solvent. There
was no need to give the plaintiff additional defendants.
238. A trend toward holding the manufacturer liable instead of the retailer makes good
social sense today. First, the manufacturer is the one responsible for the defect in the product
in most cases. It seems only fair to hold him liable rather than a retailer, who has not caused
the defect, or concealed the defect, if the manufacturer is solvent and available. Second, the
manufacture is in the best position to spread the risk of loss. Third, with the downfall of the
privity of contract doctrine consumers are able to sue the manufacturer directly. Fourth, with
the longarm jurisdiction revolution, manufacturers usually can be sued by consumers in the
consumer's state. Fifth, by holding the manufacturer primarily responsible pressure can be
maintained on manufacturers to take added precautions to insure the safety of the products
they manufacture.
239. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
240. Id. at 322.
241. The central problem in Rush was the application of Minnesota law, including its
longer statute of limitations and its policy of allowing passengers to sue drivers for ordinary
negligence which would upset the defendants "vested rights" and territorial expectations.
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and Minnesota has an interest in protecting its residents and providing a
forum for residents to litigate their claims.242 The Court, purportedly
following the rationale of Shaffer v. Heitner,243 which held that the mini-
mum contacts/fair-play standard applied to in rem as well as in per-
sonam actions, invalidated Minnesota's assertion of jurisdiction. The
Court indicated that the insured is the real party in interest in such cases
and that the contacts requirement must be met as to the insured. The
Court found no defendant contacts whereby the defendant purposefully
availed himself of the benefits or protections of the forum state.244 The
Court reaffirmed its position that contacts can not be created by the
plaintiff acting unilaterally.
24 5
Functionally speaking, the Court invalidated Seider v. Roth-type ac-
tions.246 Again, the Court denied substantive tort policy aimed at chang-
ing the defendant orientation in tort law and its operative effects on
jurisdiction theory.247 The Court used jurisdiction to thwart the possibil-
ity that Minnesota, following an interest analysis approach as it did in
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague,24 8 would apply its tort law that
does not impose guest statute limitations on injured passengers' claims.
Moreover, in Rush, the Court protected what it viewed as the legitimate
territorial substantive expectations of the defendant.249 In the eyes of the
conservative formalist Justices on the Court, this type of case epitomizes
the dangers of the social-functional approach to the vested rights of de-
fendants and its formalist notions of federalism.
The final two cases evidencing the use of jurisdiction to limit state
court choice of law are Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v.
Hall,25 ° decided in 1984, and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
242. Rush, 444 U.S. at 324. This jurisdictional strategy had developed and was used in
New York, per Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
243. Rush, 444 U.S. at 322-24. The Minnesota court, apparently following a social-func-
tional model of jurisdiction, discarded the "contacts" doctrine with its purposeful availment
corollary and addressed the due process issue by asserting its legitimate interest in providing a
forum for its residents' personal injury claims and its interest in applying its plaintiff-oriented
tort policies. The Minnesota court's position makes good social-functional sense as it places
primary emphasis on the forum's legitimate interests and current social policy.
244. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
245. Rush, 444 U.S. at 332-33.
246. Id. at 327.
247. Seider, 17 N.Y.2d 111.
248. See supra text Section I for discussion of the plaintiff-oriented model of tort law and
its effect on jurisdictional notions.
249. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
250. Rush, 444 U.S. 320. Apparently the defendant had a vested right under Indiana law
that he could rely on regardless of the forum. This vested right was given constitutional pro-
tection by the Court.
Court,25 1 decided in 1987. In Helicopteros, the Burger-Rehnquist Court
invalidated an assertion of jurisdiction by Texas courts over a Colombian
company whose principal place of business was Colombia. The company
was providing transportation for workers at an oil construction site in
Peru when one of their helicopters crashed, killing the workers
aboard.25 2 Four of the workers were Americans employed by an Ameri-
can-based company to work in Peru. The contract executed by
Helicopteros and the American company stipulated that all parties were
residents of Peru and provided that all controversies arising out of the
contract would be submitted to the jurisdiction of Peruvian courts.
These provisions suggest an attempt to protect Helicopteros from litiga-
tion in United States courts and from the substantive provisions of
United States tort law, which most likely would differ in liability and
amounts of compensation. Note also that Peruvian law prohibited con-
struction of pipelines by any non-Peruvian entity. This, in part, accounts
for the contractual stipulation that all parties are Peruvian and for the
set-up of the Peruvian company fronting for the Texas-based American
company.
The action was brought in Texas by the American survivors and
representatives of the Americans who were killed in the crash. The
Texas court exercised jurisdiction under a Texas long-arm statute and
entered a judgment for $1,140,000 against Helicopteros. The defendant
claimed no jurisdiction because of a lack of minimum contacts. The
Texas Supreme Court found minimum contacts and upheld the trial
court judgment.2 53 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
contacts were insufficient under the International Shoe standard.2 54 The
decision was complicated because the parties apparently waived consid-
eration of the case as one arising out of and related to the activities of
Helicopteros in Texas.255 Instead, the Court considered the case as in-
volving the question of whether the contacts were sufficient to support
general jurisdiction, that is, a suit against the defendant on any claim
related or unrelated to the forum. The Court analogized general jurisdic-
tion to the concept of doing business that was used in the pre-Interna-
tional Shoe era and normally required a regular and continuous pattern
of activities in the forum.2 56 After establishing this dubious distinc-
251. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
252. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
253. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19.
254. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (1982).
255. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 418-19.
256. Id at 415-16.
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tion,257 the Court then proceeded to analyze the contacts of Helicopteros
with Texas. The Court found the contacts insufficient to meet the mini-
mum contacts required for general jurisdiction. The contacts were: (1)
defendant purchased helicopters in Texas from Bell Helicopters, (2) the
helicopter pilots were trained in Texas, (3) management and maintenance
personnel were also instructed about the helicopters in Texas, and (4)
Heliocopteros received payments under the contract in the United
States.25 8 Other facts indicate that Helicopteros never had a place of
business or solicited business or recruited employees in Texas. The
Court concluded that the aggregate of these contacts was not sufficient to
meet the minimum contacts test.
25 9
A critical, social-functional analysis suggests that the Court was re-
ally concerned about the application of Texas tort law to a Columbian
defendant where the injuries took place in Peru and the Columbian de-
fendant had legitimate expectations that Peruvian law or Columbian law
would be applied in the case. Here the Court effectively prevented Texas
from applying its tort law, which undoubtedly would have substantially
different standards of tort liability and different limits on damages. °
The application of Texas law would be contrary to the legitimate territo-
rial expectations of the Columbian defendant and would subject the de-
fendant to substantive tort laws that would treat it in a very different
way.
Moreover, there are implications that the federal interests in foreign
affairs and foreign relations might be affected by the application of Texas
law in these circumstances. Though these social-functional factors are
not the announced grounds for the decision, it is hard to escape the con-
clusion that they were extremely important in determining whether the
contacts were sufficient for due process purposes. It also seems strange
for the Court not to consider the case as involving specific jurisdiction. It
seems likely that the majority of the Court would have had a harder time
dealing with the contacts question if the case were perceived as a specific
jurisdiction case. It would have been more difficult to avoid the reality
257. Id. at 411. The Court emphasized the same kind of factors that were emphasized in
the pre-International Shoe doctrine of doing business. The Court indicated that the defendant
was not authorized to do business in Texas, that the defendant made no sales in Texas, that the
defendant made no solicitations in Texas, that the defendant had no real estate in Texas, and
that the defendant had no offices in Texas. Essentially then, the defendant was not doing
business in Texas. The Court continues to use a territorial type of analysis and eschews a
social-functional approach not based on power.
258. Id. at 419-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the characterization of the question
as involving "general jurisdiction").
259. Id. at 409-13.
260. Id. at 418-19.
that (1) several Americans died because of the defendant's actions, (2)
decedents were hired in Texas by an American company and were work-
ing for an American company, (3) the defendant company was hired by
the American company under a contract that was at least partially nego-
tiated in Texas, and (4) American plaintiffs would be forced to go to Peru
or Colombia to sue the tortfeasor and face the prospects that they might
not recover under Peruvian or Colombian law. Or, if the defendant were
held liable in the foreign forum, the plaintiffs probably would not receive
what we would consider adequate damages. It would have been harder
to conclude that defendant's activities were unrelated to the forum's le-
gitimate interest in providing a forum for the American plaintiffs. Under
a social-functional approach, Texas would probably be a proper forum
for deciding the case. Under this approach, the only limit on jurisdiction
might be that of federal interests under the Foreign Commerce Clause or
the foreign affairs power. To impose limits based on these constitutional
standards would require an up-front, pragmatic examination of the ac-
tual affect that jurisdiction in Texas would have on these federal
interests.261
The last case in this series is Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court.216 2 In Asahi, the Court again used the concept of jurisdiction to
forestall California from applying its substantive tort law to a dispute
between a Japanese and a Taiwanese company over indemnification be-
tween tortfeasors. In this case, original plaintiff Gary Zurcher lost con-
trol of his motorcycle when the rear tire exploded. He was injured and
his wife, a passenger, was killed. He sued Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Co., Ltd. (Cheng Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, claim-
ing it was defective. Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint against Asahi
Metal Industry Co. (Asahi), the Japanese manufacturer of the valves
used in the tube. Asahi sold valves to Cheng Shin who then used them in
the tubes it produced. Many of the tubes found their way into the United
States. Zurcher's claim against Cheng Shin was settled out of court, and
the cause of action against Cheng Shin was dismissed, leaving only the
indemnity action of Cheng Shin against Asahi. The Court concluded
that the contacts were not sufficient to meet the minimum contacts re-
quirement and invalidated California's assertion of jurisdiction over
261. See eg., Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468
(1965) (applying Brazil's limitation on recoverable damages, in view of Brazil's dominant in-
terest in the accident).
262. Using the Foreign Commerce Clause or foreign affairs powers as limits on jurisdiction
would involve a factual look at the interests involved and an evaluative judgment of the effects
on the national or federal interest.
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Asahi.263 Though the Court talked of contacts, it is clear that under a
social-functional approach, California had no legitimate need or interest
to be effectuated by exercising jurisdiction in the indemnification dispute
between two foreign companies.
In addition, as in Helicopteros, there was the possibility of interfer-
ence with federal interests in foreign commerce and foreign affairs that
might serve in their own rights as limits separate from any due process
claim. Here, as in Helicopteros, the Court's decision can be seen as
preventing the application of California tort law to the foreign defendant,
which law would treat the defendant more harshly and would upset his
legitimate territorial expectations about what law would be applied.
These cases demonstrate through a social-functional analysis that
the Burger-Rehnquist Court utilizes the jurisdictional due process limita-
tion as a method of forestalling the choice of law decisions of state courts
in situations where application of forum law would upset what the Court
considers to be the legitimate substantive territorial expectations of the
defendant or where the application of forum law would be anachronistic
or regressive. There is a formalistic distinction in the Court's rhetoric,
between choice of law and jurisdiction. A social-functional critique,
however, suggests that the actual decisions, as distinct from the written
opinions, are made on substantive policy grounds and that, under due
process theory, jurisdictional questions should be characterized as sub-
stantive due process questions falling under social-functional
standards.2' 4
V. Jurisdiction as Social-Functional Policy
A social-functional analysis, not sidetracked by the formalist rheto-
ric and the linguistic facade of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's opinions,
reveals that jurisdiction has always been a social-functional policy con-
cept. It has always involved a consideration of the forum needs, substan-
tive policy, and ways in which these needs and policies could be
effectuated. There has always been a need for states to be able to affect
persons physically located outside the territorial boundaries of the forum.
Jurisdiction has essentially been a policy-effectuating and policy-judging
concept. Prior to Pennoyer's26 formalist constructions, jurisdiction had
not had a rigid territorial structure. States often asserted jurisdiction
over nonresidents. 266 It was the Pennoyer decision, drawing on Justice
263. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
264. Id. at 116.
265. See supra text Section III.
266. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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Story's attempt to create hard, territorially structured jurisdictional rules
out of Huber's theoretical political principles of state power, that first
articulated the rigid territorial view of jurisdiction.2 6 7 The practice of
state courts prior to Pennoyer had been much more fluid, varied, and
social-functional than Pennoyer suggests.268
The formalist theory enunciated in Pennoyer and its subsequent for-
malist embellishments tend to treat jurisdiction as a finite, objective en-
tity with tangible characteristics and parameters that can be perceived
free of social policy considerations. From the formalist perspective either
there is jurisdiction or there is not. To determine whether there is, one
simply matches the concrete, definitional characteristics against the facts
of the situation in question. Here one is reminded of Justice Roberts'
statement in United States v. Butler2 69 suggesting that in order to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a statute, it is merely necessary to lay the
statute alongside the appropriate constitutional provision and see if the
one squares with the other.27 ° It is not by accident that this formalist
statement was written in Justice Roberts' majority opinion that invali-
dated a federal processing tax in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933. The opinion, evincing the old formalist notion of federalism,
271
was decided a few short years before the revolutionary change in the
mode of interpreting the Commerce Clause and federalism in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."" in which the Court moved toward mod-
em social-functional standards of interpretation. In the formalist mode
of seeing and thinking, there was no specific constitutional provision ex-
pressly delegating to Congress the power to levy this "processing tax.273
267. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.. 284 (1956).
268. See Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 241,
258-62; see also Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L.
REV. 33 (1957) (providing a historical-analytical reappraisal of the extension of full faith and
credit to judgments and public acts).
269. Hazard, supra note 268, at 261. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 267 (discussing the
transient role of personal jurisdiction).
270. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
271. Id. at 62.
272. By a formalist notion of federalism, I am referring to the idea that the powers of
government are divided between the state and federal government in a fashion which makes
state powers separate and exclusive of federal powers. Powers are either federal or state and
they are distinguished by definitional means. The grants of power to the federal government
are important legal limits on what the federal government can do under this approach. This
approach to federalism was superseded in the 1930s and 1940s by a social-functional model
under which the lines drawn between federal and state powers is a pragmatic one based on
current needs and values. The federal government under this view is not legally limited by
state powers.
273. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Consequently, the statute did not "square" with the constitutional provi-
sion concerning the power to tax. Under such a view of law and words,
there is no room for a policy-oriented methodology of interpreting and
applying legal provisions where meaning and application are determined
by notions of social fact, need, and policy. 4
Under a social-functional concept of jurisdiction, the question is
whether there should be jurisdiction in a given social situation. The in-
quiry involves consideration of social policy and social values. Judicial
interpretation and application of jurisdictional concepts requires inquiry
into the social objectives to be achieved and the social factual context of
the particular situation before the court. For example, in McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co.,275 California had a long-arm statute authorizing
its courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident insurance companies
that insured people or property in California. The objective of the statute
was to provide a local forum for California residents who had disputes
with out-of-state insurance companies. Also implicit was California's
substantive policy, applied to protect the expectations of California resi-
dents. The statute must be seen in its full social factual context, which
includes the ways in which insurance companies behave vis-a-vis their
insured. It is not unusual for insurance companies to interpret their in-
surance contracts in their own favor and install boilerplate provisions to
disadvantage the insured. The insurance companies use every legal de-
vice to take advantage of the defendant-oriented bias built into territorial
jurisdiction. Insureds with small claims or little money will automati-
cally be disadvantaged by the territorial model of jurisdiction. All these
social-functional, contextual concerns implicitly went into California's
long-arm statute. In McGee, the Court upheld California's jurisdiction
over a Texas-based insurance company that apparently was not soliciting
business in California on any significant scale.
While jurists and scholars under the influence of the Pennoyer para-
digm like to regard McGee as an exceptional case and the high water
mark under the International Shoe standards, 2 76 from a social-functional
perspective, McGee is neither a high nor a low water mark. It is simply a
case where the Court properly applied the social-functional method in
which the forum state's legitimate needs and policy concerns are of pri-
mary importance, and in which the territorialized concept of defendants'
274. Butler, 297 U.S. at 54-56.
275. The statements by Justice Roberts, 297 U.S. at 62-63, appear to express formalist
ideology, under which the judicial role is not a creative role. The proper role of the judge is to
find meaning in the words of the legal provision by an objective, non-evaluative process.
276. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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purposeful availment of forum benefits was not the touchstone of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. A social-functional critique reveals that Pen-
noyer's progeny-in rem, quasi in rem, transient jurisdiction, implied
consent, and presence-are all expressions of the forum state's perpetual
need and interest in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with
matters of legitimate concern. Though these devices have been tradition-
ally viewed as merely exceptions to, or minor deviations from the basic
territorial principle of Pennoyer, and applied in ways that seem to make
them consistent with Pennoyer, all these doctrines are evidence of the
social infirmity of Pennoyers territorial jurisdiction notion. Pennoyer's
jurisdictional progeny were social-functional actions. The attempts to ra-
tionalize these exceptions with Pennoyer involved transparent fictions.
The emphasis in these exceptions on things, people, or actions in the fo-
rum placated only formalist minds.
In regard to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, the res was re-
garded as within the forum, but the social reality was that the forum
court was exercising power over the nonresident defendant through a
ruse. In most instances there were legitimate needs or interests to be
effectuated by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction.27 7 In rem rhetoric
involved parties and courts in specious arguments and actions that frus-
trated the development of socially responsive jurisdictional doctrines.
Transient jurisdiction, like in rem, as evidenced in Burnam v. Supe-
nor Court,278 was ensconced under Pennoyer primarily because the for-
malist territorial notion prevented state courts from dealing with
important policy goals, simply because defendants were on the other side
of the mythical state-line barrier to jurisdiction. Transient jurisdiction
was essentially a way to exercise needed extraterritorial jurisdiction and
to effectuate legitimate forum needs and interests.
Likewise, forum needs frustrated by territorial notions prompted the
development of the doctrines of implied consent and doing business. To
satisfy territorial notions, they were ostensibly based on actions by the
277. In McGee, the Court treats the case as involving only a single contract of insurance in
California and is unconcerned about the volume of business being done by the defendant, a
Texas-based insurance company with no offices or salespersons in California. Moreover, there
is no showing of any other solicitation of insurance business by the defendants in the state of
California. In short, jurisdiction was based on a single solicitation by mail from a non-resident
insurance company. Professor Weintraub, supra note 51, at 118, specifically states that McGee
was the high water mark of long arm jurisdiction. See also REESE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 74
(1984).
278. In rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction are expressions of legitimate state needs and
usually there is some connection between the defendant and the forum's interest. It is interest-
ing to note that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), has not had much effect on in rem and
quasi in rem jurisdiction.
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defendants or their agents within the forum. Nevertheless, the real basis
for such doctrines were to be found in social need and social fact, which
called for the development of extraterritorial jurisdiction along social-
functional lines.
Under all these fictitious doctrines, the territorial jurisdictional par-
adigm was preserved by focusing attention on acts, things, or persons
within the forum state. While such doctrines did help, they also placed
limits on state power, which often frustrated legitimate forum concerns.
What was needed was a fully social-functional conception of jurisdiction
commensurate with the extraterritorial needs and interests of states in
our modern federal system and commensurate with our modes of social
and economic living. Only fundamental rights or important federal in-
terests protected by the federal Constitution should limit state court ju-
risdiction, instead of outdated notions of federalism and antifunctional
state-line barriers.
Looking at other jurisdictional settings, we also see the basic social-
functional perspective at work. Divorce jurisdiction based on the domi-
cile of one spouse is the result of perceived social needs, interests, and
policy. Admiralty jurisdiction, which allows jurisdiction in any place
where the defendant's ship can be found, continues to be consistent with
due process even after Shaffer v. Heitner,27 9 primarily because of its sub-
stantive purpose of affording the historically exploited sailor a viable way
to recover wages or benefits from absent and distant shipowners.280
Other examples of in rem type proceedings where rights of nonresi-
dents may be cut off consistent with due process are probate claims, quiet
title, escheat, and trust accounting, which the forum state needs to effi-
ciently and effectively handle. All these situations show the imprint of
the social-functional method even though shrouded in formalist linguistic
garb.
In certain doctrines persons are exempted from jurisdiction even
though they were found within the forum state. We can add these to the
list of situations where the legitimate social needs and policy concerns of
the states are the critical factors under the social-function perspective. In
the following circumstances the nonresident is typically exempted from
jurisdiction under the territorial paradigm: (1) a nonresident tricked into
coming into the forum; (2) a nonresident kidnapped or carried into the
forum against his or her will; (3) a nonresident entering the forum to be a
279. 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990). In Burnham, California had a legitimate need to exercise juris-
diction over the defendant, and the defendant had suicient relationships to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction without the invocation of the transient jurisdiction concept.
280. 433 U.S. 186.
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witness in a legal proceeding; (4) a nonresident entering the forum to act
as a lawyer in another action; and (5) a nonresident who entered the
forum as a party in another action.28 All of these social policy excep-
tions furnish additional evidence of a social-functional concept of
jurisdiction.
In light of all the above situations where jurisdictional decisions
were based on social need and policy considerations that the formalists
have treated singly as incidental exceptions to a nonfunctional concept of
jurisdiction, it is hard to maintain the formalist territorial notion ofjuris-
diction as a finite, concrete entity. Likewise, it is difficult to accept the
formalist notion that legitimate forum interests and social policy are sec-
ondary, while contacts with the forum are primary. Here we see the
formalists' denial of the social-functional reality of jurisdictional con-
cepts and a determined adherence to nonfunctional territorial concepts.
Note the large, paradoxical gap between formalists' territorial rhetoric
and the social-functional nature of their actions. This is the formalists'
reactionary constitutional agenda at work.
VI. Conclusion
The social-functional nature of the International Shoe and Mullane
standards has never been fully realized or articulated. International Shoe
presented a revolutionary jurisdiction paradigm. This provided the op-
portunity and potential formula for a new era of jurisdictional thinking
that promised to sweep away the formalist territorial paradigm of Pen-
noyer, which was socially regressive and inept. Viewed in its full consti-
tutional and social context, its potential was progressive and far-
reaching. The tyranny of concepts and the territorial bias strongly en-
trenched in political and legal thinking, subtly and insidiously subverted
the new paradigm's revolutionary social-functional character. Almost
instinctively it was given territorial interpretation and twisted to fit
within the basic Pennoyer paradigm rather than to replace it. In the Bur-
ger-Rehnquist era, the subversion became intentional.
Despite the determined efforts of the Burger-Rehnquist Court to es-
tablish a reactionary return to pre-1930s formalist modes of interpreting
and applying constitutional provisions, the exigencies of social values
continue to thwart this formalist agenda. We can expect retrenchment in
formalist rhetoric, language, and doctrine, but the actions taken under
the facade of formalism will still have to pay homage to social realities.
281. See generally Kalo, The Meaning of Contact and Minimum National Contacts: Reflec-
tions on Admiralty In Rem and Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction, 59 TUL. L. REv. 24 (1984); Olsen,
Jurisdiction in Admiralty: Pennoyer v. Neff in Ship's Clothing?, 84 DIcK. L. REv. 395 (1980).
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Because of the intransigence of social fact and social values, we must
view the full social-functional dimensions of International Shoe. As ju-
risdictional theory intertwines with constitutional theory, legitimate state
interests and needs are critical. Under the fully social-functional ap-
proach implicit in International Shoe, states would be permitted to exer-
cise extraterritorial jurisdiction whenever they had a legitimate interest.
Such extraterritorial actions would be limited only when the defendant
successfully pled and proved that the state's action seriously interfered
with a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause or seri-
ously interfered with a federal interest protected by the federal
Constitution.
The prototypical model for protecting federal interests would be
found in the type of social-functional standards developed under the
Commerce Clause in the 1930s and 1940s. Interests protected by the
Commerce Clause, including its foreign commerce phrase, would limit
state extraterritorial actions, and the Court would have to apply social-
functional standards. Other federal interests implicit or explicit in other
provisions of the federal Constitution, however, would also be a source of
limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Here the model would em-
brace the type of social-functional standards developed under the Com-
merce Clause. Only in exceptional cases, when the state would be able to
convince a court that there were extremely compelling reasons why it
should be allowed to interfere with fundamental rights or federal inter-
ests, would state exercises of jurisdiction be invalidated. Under such an
approach, the Court would have to openly deal with social facts and val-
ues and would not be able to hide behind the facade of formalist-territo-
rial jurisdictional concepts.
